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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the nature of ‘idealism’ or ‘utopianism’ in Cuba’s post-
1959 socialist transition and the peculiarities of Cuban state socialism have been 
inadequately conceptualised. It hypothesises that the state-centrism of Cuba’s 
prevailing socialist model is a hybrid of ‘statist utopianism’ and the Stalinist 
imprint of a post-1970 relative Sovietisation of the Cuban Revolution. Statist 
utopianism is conceptualised in a Marxist theoretical framework as a distinctive 
approach to the socialist transition: imposing a communist vision on society 
rather than striving for its organic realisation. Unlike 16th–19th century Utopian 
socialism, statist utopianism rests on proletarian state power and has a state-
centric dynamic. The thesis distinguishes between ‘organic transcendence’ and 
statist utopian approaches to the socialist transition and identifies statist 
utopianism’s distinctive political psychology. The concept is grounded 
historically in the late 1960s Cuban and early Soviet experiences of socialist 
transition. Cuba’s 1968–70 Revolutionary Offensive, which nationalised the 
remnant urban private sector, is characterised as a statist utopian ‘great leap 
forward’. Continuities and convergences between a late 1960s ‘idealist’ phase 
and subsequent Sovietisation has been overlooked or understated, and the 
thesis identifies methodological weaknesses in the ‘historical pendulum’ 
approach to the periodisation of the Cuban Revolution. It is argued that certain 
conceptual identities and institutional peculiarities of the prevailing (and now 
receding) Cuban socialist model comprise a mutually reinforcing state-centric 
nexus that cannot be explained on the basis of Sovietisation alone, and that this 
supports the hybridisation hypothesis. The conceptualisation and application of 
the concept of statist utopianism casts the Cuban socialist transition and the 
Cuban Communist Party’s contemporary renovation project in a distinct light.  
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Introduction 
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) is undertaking what it describes as the 
‘updating’ of Cuba’s socialist economic model, a formulation that stresses 
continuity amid potentially disorienting change. Much of what has come to 
symbolise Cuba’s half-century socialist commitment, such as every citizen’s 
entitlement to a monthly quota of state-subsidised consumer goods and 
nominal full employment at the cost of low labour productivity, is fading with 
meticulous gradualism as a new Cuban socialist model takes shape.  
 
PCC secretary and Cuban president Raul Castro (2012) has called for a 
‘prosperous and sustainable socialism’, and announced that “the theoretical 
conceptualisation of the Cuban economic model” is being drafted. That the PCC 
leadership seems in no hurry to make public such a draft suggests that 
reconciling different conceptions of a prosperous and sustainable socialist 
project may be a delicate and difficult task. As leading Cuban sociologist Juan 
Valdes Paz (cited in Havana Times 2013) observes, “neither [the Soviet model] 
nor the Cuban model have been ... subjected to a complete and thorough 
evaluation, as was once promised [by the PCC leadership]”.  
 
In 2011, Havana University planning specialist Oscar Fernandez Estrada asked 
in a footnote: 
 
From the traditional state socialism that characterises Cuba today, is it moving 
towards a more decentralised state socialism? An Asian-style [i.e. Vietnamese or 
Chinese] market socialism? A self-managed socialism of the Yugoslavian variety? To 
the so-called participatory socialism of the 21st century? There is an urgent need for a 
debate aimed at a consensus on the key features of the vision of the future society 
(Fernandez Estrada 2011: 27).  
 
The Economic and Social Policy Guidelines adopted by the PCC’s 6th Congress in 
2011 are not programmatic, but a set of general and specific objectives that 
embody, and on occasion address explicitly, changes in the official conception of 
the socialist transitional society and in the approach to that transition. The 
Guidelines were drafted on the basis of a massive and organised process of 
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public consultations open to both PCC members and non-members. While such 
a clarifying debate on the nature of the socialist model that is aspired to has yet 
to take place, the gradual opening up of new spaces for public debate (including 
online) and a maturing of the debate culture in recent years has intersected with 
the contributions of Cuban academia, which has the government’s ear more so 
than in decades past.  
 
Meanwhile, the Guidelines themselves foreshadow some of this programmatic 
vision. They point, for example, to a socialist model in which small-scale private 
enterprise and mid-sized state-owned but cooperatively managed agricultural, 
industrial and services cooperatives coexist with downsized, globally 
competitive state enterprises ceded relative autonomy from central planners. An 
overarching theme of current changes is a shift away from the state-centrism1 
embodied in Cuba’s sprawling state bureaucracy; the near absolute dominance 
of state ownership and management of the economy; the byzantine maze of 
state prohibitions and bureaucratic procedures; and a pervasive, multifaceted 
state paternalism. In its size and reach, the Cuban state is gradually retreating—
with passive resistance from much of the state bureaucracy—in step with the 
implementation of the Guidelines. 
 
Despite this, it is not yet clear whether Cuban state socialism is to be reformed 
or dismantled and, if the latter, what kind of Cuban socialist model will 
supersede it. Camila Piñeiro Harnecker (2012: 46), from Havana University’s 
Centre for Research on the Cuban Economy, points out that the nature of “the 
new Cuban model” will depend (in part) on the relative influence of different 
ways of conceiving of socialism. Piñeiro Harnecker identifies three principal 
currents of socialist thought in Cuba: the ‘statist’, ‘economist’ and ‘self-
management’ currents. All three are influencing the PCC-led changes, and these 
influences are reflected in the Guidelines. Predicting which of these currents will 
predominate would be “mere speculation”; most likely, the emerging model will 
embody some combination of all three (Piñeiro Harnecker 2012: 46).  
 
                                                             
1 Throughout, state-centrism refers to the hyper-statisation of social relations.  
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The ‘statist’ current strives to perfect Cuban state socialism. It conceives of 
socialism in terms of a strong state that exercises effective control over society 
and ensures that the basic needs of all citizens are met. The statists argue that 
allowing all Cuban citizens to participate directly in decision-making in the 
workplace and at all levels of the political system—a democratisation or 
‘socialisation’2 of state powers that the self-management current considers vital 
and long overdue—would undermine political stability and social cohesion. 
However, given the deficiencies of authoritarian planning, some statists view as 
necessary a somewhat wider scope for market relations (Piñeiro Harnecker 
2012: 46–51).  
 
The economist current conceives of socialism in terms of the development of the 
productive forces, which is understood to mean GDP growth. Given wealth 
redistribution by the state, it argues, the appropriate mix of property relations 
and management forms is whatever maximises overall productivity. Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic maxim that ‘it doesn’t matter what colour the 
cat is, so long as it catches mice’ is cited approvingly by adherents of this 
current, who look to Vietnam and China for inspiration. Influenced by “the 
[globally] hegemonic neoclassical economic thought”, the economist current is 
the predominant one within the state and in Cuban society at large (Piñeiro 
Harnecker 2012: 48–9).  
 
The self-management current strives for an alternative to both market socialism 
and state socialism. To this current, the socialist transition means 
“democratising or socialising power” (Piñeiro Harnecker 2012: 49). Were this 
current to be defined solely in these terms, it would encompass a broad 
spectrum of views, but Piñeiro Harnecker tends to conflate a paradigmatic pole 
with her own elaborate doctrinal views and those of her closest co-thinkers. (I 
will refer to this paradigmatic pole as the ‘socialisation’ pole to distinguish it 
from Piñeiro Harnecker’s somewhat ambiguous ‘self-management current’.) At 
its leftist fringe, this pole’s critiques of Cuban state socialism are so sweeping 
that they are barely distinguishable from anarchist critiques of Marxism.3 At its 
                                                             
2 ‘Socialisation’ and ‘democratisation’ are used more or less interchangeably in the self-
management discourse.  
 
3 See, for example, Campos 2014. 
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rightist fringe, advocacy of a deepening of Cuba’s socialist democracy sits 
uneasily with admiration for Chinese and Vietnamese market socialism.4 
 
Statist utopianism 
 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the Marxist understanding of the 
dynamics of socialist transition and casts the Cuban socialist transition, and the 
PCC’s contemporary ‘updating’ of Cuba’s economic model, in a distinct light. As 
a Marxist critique of state socialism, it engages with the socialisation pole’s 
diagnosis of the deficiencies of Cuba’s prevailing socialist model in an original 
conceptual framework. My hypothesis is that Cuba’s state-centrism is a hybrid 
of what I conceptualise in this thesis as ‘statist utopianism’ and the Stalinist 
imprint of the Cuban Revolution’s partial and uneven Sovietisation during the 
1970s and early 1980s. This hypothesis addresses a gap in the Spanish- and 
English-language literature on the Cuban socialist transition: a key constituent 
element of Cuban state-centrism has been inadequately conceptualised.  
 
One of these elements, the Sovietisation legacy, is widely acknowledged and well 
documented. Yet references in the literature to Cuban state socialism (or to the 
prevailing Cuban model as ‘actually existing’, ‘real’, ‘traditional’ or ‘20th century’ 
socialism, etc.) have overlooked, understated or inadequately conceptualised the 
distinctiveness of Cuban state socialism. I will argue that another constituent 
element of Cuban state-centrism, namely statist utopianism, lends Cuban state 
socialism its distinctiveness. In a December 2010 speech to Cuba’s National 
Assembly of People’s Power, Raul Castro bluntly told deputies and the nation:  
 
[E]rroneous and unsustainable conceptions of socialism … have been deeply rooted 
in broad sectors of the population over the years as a result of the excessively 
paternalistic, idealistic and egalitarian approach instituted by the Revolution in the 
interests of social justice (Castro, R 2010).  
 
Alluding to the PCC’s 1968 Revolutionary Offensive that expropriated and 
banned urban small businesses and self-employment, Castro said that the 
Cuban state had turned Vladimir Lenin’s idea that the proletarian state should 
own the fundamental means of production “into an absolute, and almost all of 
                                                             
4 See for example Alzugaray Treto cited in Cameron 2011e.  
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the country’s economic activity became state property. The steps we’ve taken, 
and will take, to broaden self-employment5 and make it more flexible are the 
fruit of profound reflection and analysis, and we can assure you that this time 
there’ll be no turning back” (Castro, R 2010). 
 
Here, Castro associates a paternalistic, idealistic and egalitarian approach to the 
socialist transition with the state-centric suppression of remnant urban private 
enterprise. What is this idealistic approach, and what is the nature of its 
association—if any—with state-centrism? My hypothesis is that the idealistic 
approach and the Stalinist imprint of Sovietisation coalesced, and that state-
centrism is the nexus between them. If this hypothesis is supported, then Cuban 
state socialism is a curious hybrid of these two contrasting influences on Cuba’s 
prevailing (and now receding) socialist model. 
 
My research found no well-developed conceptualisation of idealism in the above 
sense in the scholarly literature on either the socialist transition in general or on 
the Cuban socialist transition. The numerous references or allusions to 
‘idealism’ or, synonymously, ‘utopianism’ in the specific context of the socialist 
transition do not amount to such a concept. Chapter 1 is dedicated to 
conceptualising what I define as ‘statist utopianism’. Unlike 16th–19th century 
Utopian socialism, statist utopianism rests on proletarian state power and has a 
state-centric dynamic.  
 
My conceptualisation of statist utopianism is grounded in the Cuban experience 
of socialist transition. Drawing on Fidel Castro’s and Raul Castro’s reflections 
on the PCC’s approach in the late 1960s, key facets of utopianism-as-unrealism 
in the socialist transition are identified. Statist utopianism is then defined as 
‘imposing a communist vision on society rather than striving for its realisation’. 
The nature of that imposition and its consequences for the socialist transition, 
and for the socialist model, are conceptualised in a Marxist theoretical 
framework. The abstract nature of much of this exposition is unavoidable: a 
theoretical approach is needed to drill down to the essence of statist utopianism. 
 
                                                             
5 In official Cuban discourse, the term trabajo por cuenta propia, literally ‘working for 
oneself’, is a euphemism for employment outside the state sector. It encompasses the 
owners of small private businesses and their employees, and cooperative members. 
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We then descend from these heights of abstraction to ground the concept and 
enrich it in the early Soviet experience of War Communism. This experience 
illustrates how statist utopianism arises from the nexus between circumstances, 
political leadership and political psychology. Statist utopianism, which has an 
intrinsic subjective dimension, arises from the interplay of human subjectivity 
and ‘objective’ possibilities and constraints: those on the socialist transition in 
general, and those on a given socialist transition in all of its concrete richness 
and contradiction. The analytical emphasis is on the Marxist political economy 
of statist utopianism with excursions into political psychology. 
 
In Chapter 2, the concept of statist utopianism is applied to Cuba’s socialist 
transition in the late 1960s. A shift in the official attitude to material incentives 
in late 1966 foreshadowed the PCC’s Revolutionary Offensive, launched in early 
1968, which I characterise as a statist utopian ‘great leap forward’. The 
historical-conceptual exposition is based on a close analysis of the official 
justifications for these policy shifts. I show that the Revolutionary Offensive’s 
suppression of the remnant urban private sector had a state-centric dynamic. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis.  
 
In Chapter 3, the concept of statist utopianism is applied to the prevailing 
Cuban socialist model.6 ‘The prevailing model’ refers to that which emerged 
during the 1970s under the influence of Sovietisation, and which is gradually 
being superseded by ‘the emerging model’ under Raul Castro's presidency. 
Continuities and convergences between the late 1960s ‘idealist’ and subsequent 
Sovietisation phases of the Cuban Revolution—phases which tend to be 
contrasted—have received little attention in the literature. I will argue that the 
influence of statist utopianism on the prevailing model has been significant, 
enduring and pervasive; and that two lines of evidence converge in favour of the 
hybridisation hypothesis. An analysis of the emerging Cuban socialist model in 
this light is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
  
 
                                                             
6 By ‘model’ I mean a relatively durable core of concepts, methods, institutions and 
mentalities. The notion of the model helps to distinguish between lesser and more 
fundamental changes: changes within a model and a change of model. Note that a 
model in this sense is a purely analytical category.  
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Methods and limitations 
 
My conceptualisation of statist utopianism is grounded in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels’ historical materialism. The analytical method is dialectical. 
For example, concepts are defined in relation to their antitheses (where 
applicable); and the dialectical notion of a unity of opposites underpins both my 
conception of the socialist transitional society and what I term the principle of 
complementarity. I strive to combine theoretical and historical analysis so that 
each enriches the other. While the bulk of the conceptualisation takes place in 
Chapter 1, it spills over into subsequent chapters. While the theoretical-
conceptual framework and analytical method are Marxist, my sources are not 
limited to Marxist analyses, nor to partisans or sympathisers of the Cuban 
Revolution. I have strived to judge scholarship on its merits.  
 
A significant limitation of my research is that it has been based on the relevant 
Spanish- and English-language literature that I have been able to access. In the 
case of the Cuban literature, this is a small fraction of the total and may not be 
representative. Unfortunately, much of the relevant specialist Cuban literature 
is not published online and is only readily accessible in Cuba. Many of the 
Cuban sources cited in this thesis are referenced to my own published, original 
translations. These are, as far as I am aware, the only such translations. All are 
acknowledged as my own in the References.  
 
This thesis is a work of conceptual synthesis, historical analysis and 
reinterpretation. It contributes to both the general theoretical literature on the 
socialist transition and to the Cuban socialist transition literature. It engages 
with the Cuban and wider debate on the future of Cuba’s socialist project. 
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Chapter 1: Statist utopianism 
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to 
which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement 
which abolishes the present state of things.  
 
Karl Marx, The German ideology7  
 
This chapter establishes the theoretical-conceptual framework for the analysis 
of Cuba’s socialist model that will be undertaken in Chapters 2 and 3. The core 
concept developed in this chapter is ‘statist utopianism’. Statist utopianism is 
conceptualised as a distinctive approach to the socialist transition: imposing a 
communist vision on society rather than striving for its realisation. This 
chapter also discusses the consequences of this approach for the socialist 
transition and for the nature of the socialist model. Statist utopianism does not 
refer to 16th–19th century Utopian socialism, which was not state-oriented. By 
contrast, statist utopianism rests on proletarian state power.  
 
At the heart of my conceptualisation of statist utopianism is the attitude of the 
proletarian state to ‘capitalist vestiges’: survivals of capitalism (e.g. markets, 
remnant private enterprise, individualism) that are anticipated to disappear in 
the approach to communism. Corresponding to two basic attitudes to capitalist 
vestiges are divergent approaches to effecting or facilitating their 
disappearance: ‘organic transcendence’ and ‘suppression’. Engels’ (1947 [1878]: 
417) conception of the ‘withering away’ of the proletarian state as the conditions 
for its obsolescence mature is a vivid metaphor for organic transcendence. The 
antithetical approach is the state’s suppression of capitalist vestiges in 
anticipation of communism. 
 
Organic transcendence is characterised by a relatively harmonious withering 
away of causally related capitalist vestiges (e.g. commodified labour power and 
the relative scarcity that gives rise to it). Suppression ‘runs ahead’ of the socialist 
transition by suppressing ‘superficial’ capitalist vestiges rather than addressing 
the more fundamental capitalist vestiges that give rise to them. This introduces 
                                                             
7 Marx 1846 (emphasis in original). 
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or intensifies an incongruence of the socialist model. Suppression may be 
complemented by ‘constructive’ measures (e.g. a thriving state bureaucracy in 
place of thriving petty commerce) that compound this incongruence. Thus 
suppressive and constructive forms of statist utopianism are recognised.  
 
Both the suppressive and constructive forms of statist utopianism manifest as 
the incongruence of a socialist model arising from a tendency to favour one pole 
of a duality (e.g. moral–material, planning–market) to the exclusion of the 
other. This ‘binary exclusivity’ gives rise to statist utopian paradoxes, such as 
that overzealous central planning undermines the efficacy of planning more 
than does a certain degree of enterprise autonomy. I will argue that statist 
utopianism has a state-centric dynamic: the state absorbs society rather than 
dissolves into society.  
 
There are numerous references in the literature to ‘utopianism’ in the socialist 
transition context. I begin by situating my own concept in this literature. The 
rest of this chapter is an exposition of this concept. The point of departure is an 
analysis of Fidel Castro’s critical reflections on what he described as the PCC 
leadership’s idealist and utopian approach in the late 1960s. This anchors the 
exposition of statist utopianism in the Cuban experience of socialist transition 
and draws attention to the multi-faceted nature of statist utopianism. It also 
serves to introduce key analytical themes. 
 
This is followed by a systematic theoretical exposition of statist utopianism 
grounded in a Marxist conception of the socialist transition. This conception 
draws on Marx’s distinction between base and superstructure and on the work 
of Marxist economic theorists Ernest Mandel and Charles Bettelheim, among 
other sources. The method of exposition is to introduce subsidiary concepts 
(capitalist vestiges, organic transcendence and suppression, binary exclusivity, 
etc.) sequentially. The concept of statist utopianism is built up from these 
conceptual building blocks. The analytical method is dialectical. 
 
Treatments of ‘the subjective factor’ in the socialist transition theoretical 
literature seldom venture into the political psychology of Marxist leadership. 
Imposing a communist vision on society has intrinsic political-psychological 
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and moral dimensions. My conceptualisation strives for a synthesis of the 
political-economic and subjective dimensions of statist utopianism. Finally, the 
concept of statist utopianism is grounded in the early Soviet experience of War 
Communism, which serves as a case study in miniature. War Communism 
illustrates how statist utopianism arises from the interaction of circumstances, 
political leadership and political psychology in the socialist transition.  
 
Utopianism and statist utopianism 
 
The Utopian socialism of the 16th–19th centuries pursued its communist 
aspirations along two main paths. One approach was to establish Utopian 
village or urban communes in the hope that these would spread throughout 
society by dint of example. The other was to appeal to the ‘enlightened’ 
bourgeoisie to adopt contrived communist schemes or to bourgeois 
philanthropy to fund them. Neither of these approaches was state-oriented. 
Unlike social democracy, Utopian socialism did not orient to the bourgeois 
state’s parliamentary democracy. Unlike Marxism, it eschewed class struggle 
and dismissed Marx’s doctrine that the road to communism passes through the 
revolutionary conquest of state power. The essence of the classical Marxist 
critique of Utopian socialism is that Utopianism was unrealistic: its means 
could not lead to the desired communist ends (see Engels 1977 [1892]).  
 
Marx and Engels contrasted their own doctrine with those of the Utopian 
socialists. Unlike contrived Utopian schemes, theirs was grounded in the 
“historical movement going on under our very eyes”, namely the rise of the 
capitalist mode of production and the unfolding of its contradictions and 
potentialities for social transformation (Marx and Engels 1977 [1848]: 120). 
Early communist doctrines were necessarily Utopian, they argued, because 
capitalism itself was then in its infancy. The Utopians “had to construct the 
elements of a new society out of their own heads, because within the old society 
the elements of the new were not as yet generally apparent” (Engels 1947 
[1878]: 394). Born of imagination unrestrained by scientific insight, Utopian 
socialism was saturated with idealism, specifically an unrealistic sense of what 
can be achieved with appeals to enthusiasm and moral commitment. 
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Utopian socialism was the child of socialist humanism. It expressed the 
immaturity of the communist movement in the epoch of the rise of the capitalist 
mode of production. The rise of Marxism in the late 19th century and of socialist 
revolutions in the 20th shifted controversies on the realism of communist 
strivings to a new and higher plane: the socialist transition. The literature on 
what might constitute a realistic approach to the socialist transition is vast and 
varied. Yet despite numerous references to ‘utopianism’ (or synonymously, 
‘idealism’) in the Cuban and wider socialist transition literature, no well-
developed conceptualisation of utopianism-as-unrealism in this context appears 
to exist. If for no other reason than to avoid terminological ambiguity, Marxist 
political economy needs such a concept. 
 
References to ‘utopianism’ in the socialist transition literature belong to one of 
two broad categories of meaning. One, echoing Marx and Engels’ critique of 
Utopian socialism, uses ‘utopianism’ pejoratively as a synonym—with Utopian 
socialist connotations—for unrealism. In this vein, Bettelheim argues that the 
idea of an instantaneous and complete “abolition of market relations is as 
utopian and dangerous as the notion of the ‘immediate abolition’ of the state” 
(Bettelheim and Sweezy 1971: 19). The other usage rescues ‘utopianism’ from 
derision and imbues it with a very different meaning. For example, in ‘Updating 
Cuban socialism: a utopian critique’, Luis Suarez Salazar (2014: 2) cites 
liberation theology theorist Franz Hinkelammert: “The essence of utopia is a 
critique of present conditions and the hope for a better world”. In the spirit of 
this epigraph, Suarez Salazar argues that: 
 
It is possible to build a [Cuban] ‘socialist model’ that is more self-reliant, effective, 
efficient, economically self-sustainable, environmentally sustainable and democratic 
than [the prevailing model] (Suarez Salazar 2014: 2). 
 
These two broad usages of ‘utopianism’ in the socialist transition context are 
equally legitimate, but incompatible. My conceptualisation of statist utopianism 
is fully compatible with Suarez Salazar’s conviction expressed in the passage 
above. My premise is that communism is not utopian (in the sense of fanciful), 
but a possible future for humanity. Yet my concept belongs to the first category: 
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utopianism-as-unrealism. Both senses of ‘utopianism’ are well represented in 
the Cuban academic and wider literature. 
 
Imposing communism 
 
From mid-1970 onwards, a recurring theme in Fidel Castro’s public discourse 
was what he described as the PCC leadership’s idealist and utopian approach to 
the socialist transition in the late 1960s. In the Main Report to the 1st PCC 
Congress in December 1975—addressing what the PCC leadership perceived to 
be its own past mistakes—he observed: “Revolutions usually have utopian 
periods in which their protagonists ... assume that historical goals are much 
nearer and that human will, wishes and intentions, towering over objective 
facts, can accomplish anything” (Castro, F cited in Mesa-Lago 1978: 55).  
 
This passage captures the heady ethos of the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s, 
especially the late 1960s. Importantly for our conceptualisation of statist 
utopianism, Castro suggests that revolutions typically have utopian periods in 
which the Revolution does not yet know the limits of its transformative power. 
The contours of revolutionary realism and utopianism (unrealism) are 
imperceptible; only hindsight will reveal them. It appears that will, imagination 
and audacity can move mountains. Through the telescope of disdain for received 
wisdom, disdain without which the old regime might have endured, historical 
goals—in 1960s Cuba, that goal became communism—seem much closer than 
they are. 
 
In other selected passages from his public speeches (all cited in Mesa-Lago 
1978: 26–56 from various official Cuban sources), Castro expands on the theme 
of utopianism in the socialist transition. Here, he cautions against the attempt 
to impose a communist vision: “Some try to impose their ideas on reality rather 
than reality on their ideas” (August 1970). Here, he alludes to a moral 
dimension of that imposition (in the Cuban case) and the folly of a great leap 
forward: “Perhaps our major idealism has been to believe that a society which 
has scarcely left the shell of capitalism could enter, in one bound, into a society 
in which everyone would behave in an ethical and moral manner” (September 
1970).  
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Here, Castro elaborates on the theme of imposing one’s communist vision on 
society: “If in the pursuit of communism we idealistically go further ahead than 
is possible, we will have to retreat sooner or later” (May 1971). This may sound 
like a truism, but let us draw out its theoretical content. ‘Further ahead than is 
possible’ suggests that there are certain constraints on the unfolding of the 
socialist transition; it might not be rigidly constrained, but neither is it 
completely arbitrary. It can only unfold, and only at a pace that does not 
compromise its organic integrity. Pressing the accelerator beyond certain limits 
is ultimately counterproductive, because sooner or later—Castro seems to 
suggest here—one is compelled to retreat in order to take a real step forward 
rather than a contrived leap forward.  
 
Given the constraints on the socialist transition, there is a dialectical tension 
between addressing the needs of the present and the needs of the future 
simultaneously. That tension should be recognised in theory and in practice. 
This is no easy task. As Castro observes: “Perhaps the most difficult task [in 
striving] towards communism is that of knowing how to conciliate—
dialectically—the [approach] which the present requires of us with the final 
objective” (July 1973). Expanding on this theme, he draws attention to a 
paradox: that the socialist transition should be pursued “slowly to arrive 
quickly; slowly to arrive well; and slowly to be sure to arrive” [my emphasis] 
(December 1970). This is the most fundamental of several such paradoxes that I 
will refer to as ‘statist utopian paradoxes’. 
 
In the passage below, Castro alludes to another facet of what I term statist 
utopianism: namely, statist utopian illusions. As we shall see in relation to the 
Soviet experience of War Communism, these illusions can be powerfully 
compelling and difficult to dispel. Castro observes that when communism is 
pursued arbitrarily, i.e. when long-term strategic goals of the communist 
movement are pursued as immediate or short-term objectives of the socialist 
transition, then the associated progress is illusory. This gives rise to statist 
utopian illusions such as this: “[W]hen it might have seemed as though we were 
drawing nearer to communist forms of production and distribution, we were 
actually pulling away from the correct methods for the [prior] construction of 
socialism” (December 1975).  
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Another theme of Castro’s self-critical reflections is ignorance or, to put it more 
kindly and fairly, youthful inexperience. At the 1st PCC Congress in 1975, he 
frankly acknowledged that he and other PCC leaders had been “totally ignorant 
about the most basic matters related to economic science and to socialist 
construction” (December 1975). In 1976, Raul Castro, then the deputy PCC 
secretary and Cuba’s defence minister, recalled the Cuban leadership’s disdain 
in the late 1960s for anything to do with money, which smacked of capitalism to 
them:  
 
We taught [cadres] to look down on [state enterprise budgets and financial 
accounting, revenues, taxes, inter-enterprise payments, etc.] as running counter to 
communist morale and awareness, because in our ignorance of economic matters we 
viewed them as overly capitalist (cited in Mesa-Lago 1978: 36). 
 
This brief passage merits a closer analysis. Budgets, cost accounting, revenues, 
taxes, etc. were all survivals from capitalism—Cuba’s communists did not need 
to invent them—that the PCC leadership regarded as superfluous in a 
communist society and therefore destined to disappear in the approach to 
communism. They were, then, what I will define in this chapter as ‘capitalist 
vestiges’. The attitude of the PCC leadership to these particular capitalist 
vestiges (all of which involved the use of money) was to view them disdainfully 
as ‘overly capitalist’. The leadership worried that resorting to them would 
demoralise communists and blunt their revolutionary consciousness. 
 
It is not that utilising such capitalist vestiges is inherently demoralising for 
communists; if the necessity or utility of something is understood, then its use 
need not be cause for demoralisation. According to Raul Castro, the problem 
was that the PCC leadership—in its ‘ignorance’ of economic realities—had 
viewed these capitalist vestiges as anathema and alien to the socialist transition. 
In Chapter 2, we will see that the PCC leadership did not keep such views to 
itself. In the late 1960s, it encouraged all Cuban communists to perceive certain 
capitalist vestiges in these terms. Revolutionary consciousness was associated 
with this perception, but it could conceivably have been associated with some 
alternative perception, such as that cost accounting is an indispensable tool of 
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socialist construction. It was question of attitudes, and this particular attitudinal 
problem was of the PCC leadership’s own making.  
 
These citations, selected for their illustrative value, touch on several key themes 
of what we will now proceed to conceptualise as statist utopianism. Fidel Castro 
described the PCC’s approach in the late 1960s as idealist and utopian, but these 
labels convey nothing of the specific content of what amounts to (1) a distinctive 
approach to the socialist transition and (2) the consequences of this approach 
for that transition. Together, this approach and its consequences amount to a 
distinctive phenomenon of the socialist transition.  
 
Capitalist vestiges  
 
Statist utopianism is a distinctive approach to the socialist transition: imposing 
a communist vision on society rather than striving for its realisation. The 
concept also encompasses the consequences of this approach for that transition 
and for the nature of the socialist model. The exposition of this concept that 
follows is grounded in a Marxist conception of the socialist transition, the 
premises and assumptions of which are open to challenge. However, the reader 
is urged to accept them for the sake of argument. Before proceeding with this 
argument, I will clarify my usage in this thesis of some key Marxist terms.  
 
‘Communism’ refers to a mature global post-capitalist society. It is considered 
axiomatic that such a society would be one of material abundance and social 
equality, abundance being a precondition for substantive equality (as distinct 
from egalitarianism). It is assumed that the conscious goal of such a society 
would be the nurturing of rich individualities (not wealthy individuals). Finally, 
it is assumed that having cultivated the nobler side of human nature—alongside 
the withering away of exploitative and oppressive human relations and of the 
competitive struggle of each against all—it would have changed that nature. 
How much is a matter of speculation, and we will refrain from speculating.  
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For our purposes, defining an intermediate stage between capitalism and 
communism is superfluous, so the nebulous term ‘socialism’ can be avoided.8 
Where it serves clarity and the intended meaning is unambiguous, references to 
socialism in the cited literature will be substituted by paraphrasing or by the use 
of square brackets. ‘The socialist transition’ refers to the whole of the period (or 
process) of transition from capitalism to communism, and ‘the socialist 
transitional society’ to a post-capitalist society oriented towards communism. 
‘The proletarian state’ is the state that arises in the proletarian revolution that 
overthrows the capitalist state. Other key concepts will be introduced as needed. 
 
The socialist transitional society is an integral whole comprising three 
constituent elements. The first is that part of capitalism’s legacy that is 
conserved and developed on the basis that it is viewed (by most people) as a 
necessary or desirable foundation on which to build. Desirable medical 
advances, literacy, the internet and automated production techniques are 
illustrative. The second constituent element comprises possible or actual 
precursors of communism that emerge and develop not under capitalism, but in 
the socialist transitional society. Examples are planned economy (though not 
necessarily a command economy); the cost-free, needs-based distribution of an 
expanding sphere of consumer goods and services; and proletarian 
internationalism on the scale of nations. 
 
The third constituent element of the socialist transitional society is that part of 
capitalism’s legacy the disappearance of which in the approach to communism 
is anticipated: ‘capitalist vestiges’. Note that ‘capitalist vestige’ is defined 
‘subjectively’ here. What makes something a capitalist vestige is not that it will 
actually disappear in the approach to communism. It may or may not. 
Something is a capitalist vestige if its disappearance is anticipated in the sense 
of being regarded as likely or certain. It may also be anticipated in the sense that 
                                                             
8 Socialism as distinct from communism is variously understood to mean the lower 
phase of communism in Marx’s (1977 [1891]: 17) Critique of the Gotha programme, 
one or more 20th century post-capitalist societies or any post-capitalist society that 
officially strives towards communism. Mandel (1974: 724) notes that Joseph Stalin’s 
1936 proclamation that the Soviet Union had arrived at socialism contributed to 
theoretical confusion and terminological ambiguity. In the Cuban context, socialism 
may refer to either Cuba’s post-capitalist society and official communist objective, some 
ill-defined intermediate stage that is aspired to or the transition between capitalism 
and communism.  
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its disappearance is strongly desired and eagerly awaited. Typical examples of 
capitalist vestiges are markets, individualism and the proletarian state.9 
 
Pretentions to scientific objectivity notwithstanding, Marxist conceptions of 
communism may be an eclectic mix of the well founded, the somewhat 
speculative, the utopian (fanciful) and the reactionary. Somewhat speculative is 
the unresolved debate about whether commodity production and exchange (i.e. 
market relations) would or should completely disappear under communism.10 
Whether it is homosexuality or homophobia that is a capitalist vestige is a 
matter of opinion. Some might argue that homosexuality is bourgeois decadence 
destined to disappear and that the party and state should discourage it;11 others, 
myself included, would argue that this is homophobic prejudice masquerading 
as Marxist scientific insight.  
 
Transcendence and suppression 
 
There are two contrasting approaches to the disappearance of capitalist vestiges. 
I term them ‘organic transcendence’ and ‘suppression’. Both are bound up with, 
and can only be grasped in relation to, the causal connections between capitalist 
vestiges. Since both may use state coercion to effect or facilitate the 
disappearance of certain capitalist vestiges, these two approaches cannot be 
distinguished from one another on this basis. Suppression is defined in contrast 
to organic transcendence, so we begin by introducing the latter.  
 
Engels’ conception of the withering away of the proletarian state as the 
conditions for its obsolescence mature is a vivid metaphor for organic 
transcendence: 
                                                             
9 The proletarian state may legitimately be considered a capitalist vestige because it 
emerges in a political revolution prior to the social revolution that abolishes capitalism: 
“The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the 
position of ruling class” (Marx and Engels 1977 [1848]: 126). 
 
10 See, for example, the late 1980s exchange between Mandel and market socialism 
theorist Alec Nove in New Left Review. Each regarded the other as utopian. Nove 1987 
and Mandel 1986 are representative contributions to this debate.  
 
11 For example, the Cuban newspaper Granma Weekly Review (cited in Mesa-Lago 
1978: 103) reported on May 9, 1971 that “residual manifestations” of homosexuality had 
been found among the Cuban youth. 
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[State interference] in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, 
superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the 
administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is 
not ‘abolished’. It withers away [emphasis in original] (Engels 1947 [1878]: 417). 
 
‘Dies out of itself’ suggests that this withering away is more or less spontaneous, 
an organic process that proceeds in step with progress towards communism in 
other spheres. The Oxford Online Dictionary (2014) includes two senses of 
‘organic’ that could have been penned with Engels’ conception in mind: 
“Denoting or characterised by a harmonious relationship between the elements 
of a whole”; and “Characterised by gradual or natural development”. Here, the 
elements of the whole are the constituent elements of the socialist transitional 
society: capitalism’s durable legacy, communist precursors and capitalist 
vestiges. Gradualism is inherent in the notion of withering away. 
 
In Engels’ conception, the state’s coercive powers (which constitute its essence) 
become superfluous in one domain of social relations after another. The state 
‘dissolves into’ non-coercive institutions of social self-management, a process 
that depends on the conditions for this supersession maturing. One such 
condition is a surge in labour productivity that would allow the population as a 
whole to enjoy a two to three day work week. Given abundant leisure time—
elusive for the vast majority under late capitalism—popular self-government 
could make administrative specialists (the state ‘bureaucracy’) increasingly 
unnecessary. Automated production is the technical basis for such a 
productivity leap (Mandel 1974: 675–6).  
 
The withering away of the state depends, then, on the withering away of another 
capitalist vestige: the low labour productivity (from the standpoint of 
communism) inherited from capitalism.12 It is also bound up with the withering 
away of other capitalist vestiges, above all social classes and social inequality. If 
the withering away of the state is dependent on the withering away of other 
capitalist vestiges, how can we grasp this whole chain of causality? Marx’s 
distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ lies at the heart of the materialist 
conception of history advanced by Marx and Engels. This distinction has been 
                                                             
12 This is the case globally, though perhaps not in the most industrialised societies 
where labour productivity is already relatively high.  
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variously interpreted and its validity both challenged and defended, but these 
controversies lie well beyond the scope of this thesis. I will simply offer my own 
interpretation then discuss its relevance.  
 
For Marx, societies are structured around two kinds of social relations, those 
that belong to the base and the superstructure, respectively: 
 
In the social production of their existence, people inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. 
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure (Marx 
1859: 503). 
 
The base comprises what Marx terms the ‘production relations’. Unlike the 
social relations embodied in institutions, production relations do not arise 
intentionally. They arise spontaneously in the social processes of (material and 
intellectual) production and distribution that underpin all human societies, and 
which are obligatory because people’s livelihoods depend on them. The nature 
of these relations—egalitarian and solidaristic, or unequal and exploitative—
depends on the way in which possession (as distinct from legal ownership) of 
the means of production is socially distributed. In class societies, the production 
relations have a class dimension.  
 
The institutional ‘superstructure’ of society arises by design on the basis of these 
production relations, mediated by awareness and intentionality—political, 
moral, religious, etc. For example, trade unions arise on the basis of certain 
production relations, mediated by an awareness of common interests. The law 
recognises property rights that uphold (other than in a social revolution) the 
dominant production relations; and the state, an institution of class supremacy, 
enforces these laws. The web of production relations is the base of society, but 
these relations are in turn conditioned by the level of development of the 
productive forces: the means of production plus the people who set them in 
motion with their knowledge, skills and labour. Marx summarises the whole 
conception in two sentences:  
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The mode of production [i.e. a major epoch in socio-economic evolution] of material 
life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not 
people’s consciousness that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness (Marx 1859: 503).  
 
In the two passages cited above, ‘arises [from]’, ‘appropriate to’, ‘conditions’ and 
‘determines’ describe the nature of the causal relationships between the 
productive forces, production relations, the institutional superstructure and 
conscious reflections of social existence. No mechanistic correspondence is 
implied, only determination in the final instance.13 Nor does Marx suggest or 
imply that these arrows of causal influence are unidirectional. The base gives 
rise to the superstructure, but the superstructure in turn influences the base, as 
when bourgeois states uphold capitalist production relations (by giving them 
legal force) and proletarian states undermine them.  
 
When capitalist vestiges are viewed in terms of Marx’s base-superstructure 
distinction, their ultimate causal relationships become clear. As part of the 
superstructure, the state is a ‘superficial’ capitalist vestige. Two successively 
deeper ones ultimately give rise to it. One is the heterogeneity of production 
relations (i.e. the persistence of social classes). The other lies deeper still. The 
heterogeneity of production relations rests on the (inadequate from the 
standpoint of communism) productive forces carried over from capitalism. The 
underdevelopment of the productive forces is the deepest capitalist vestige. If, 
with the wave of an anarchist’s magic wand, the proletarian state were to vanish, 
then some state would inevitably arise to fill the void. An institution of class 
supremacy (a state in the Marxist sense) is both necessary and inevitable for as 
long as there are social classes and non-trivial social inequalities. 
 
In a passing reference to utopianism in the socialist transition, Bettelheim 
observes that the notion of the “abolition of market relations is as utopian and 
dangerous as the notion of the ‘immediate abolition’ of the state, and is similar 
                                                             
13 Economistic misinterpretations of historical materialism began in the 19th century, 
eliciting this clarification from Engels (1890): “According to the materialist conception 
of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and 
reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if 
somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining 
one, he or she transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless 
phrase” [emphasis in original]. 
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in nature” [emphasis in original] (Bettelheim and Sweezy 1971: 19). He does not 
advocate market socialism (“the ultimate aim is the complete elimination of 
market relationships”), but objects to the sudden abolition of all market 
relations: the hypothetical extreme of an arbitrary approach (Bettelheim and 
Sweezy 1971: 20). A contradiction (i.e. an uneasy coexistence) between plan and 
market is inherent in the socialist transitional society, and is the “surface effect” 
of “a deeper contradiction ... at the level of the production relationships and 
productive forces” (Bettelheim and Sweezy 1971: 18).  
 
Generalising from Bettelheim’s argument above regarding the state and market 
relations, capitalist vestiges are embedded in a hierarchy of ultimate causation. 
In other words, some ultimately give rise to others. Organic transcendence is 
characterised by the relatively harmonious withering away of causally related 
capitalist vestiges. Suppression is the antithetical approach. Note that the use of 
state coercion to effect the disappearance of capitalist vestiges is ‘suppression’ 
only if it introduces or intensifies a disharmony (i.e. a contradiction or an  
incongruence) between causally related capitalist vestiges (e.g. between 
production relations and property relations) or more generally, an incongruence 
of the socialist model. 
 
To recapitulate, capitalist vestiges are capitalist survivals that are expected to 
disappear in the socialist transition. Organic transcendence and suppression are 
contrasting modes of their disappearance; both may use state coercion to effect 
this disappearance. Engels’ conception of the withering away of the state is a 
metaphor for organic transcendence, which is characterised by the relatively 
harmonious withering away of causally related capitalist vestiges. Suppression 
is the antithetical approach, whereby state coercion introduces or intensifies a 
disharmony between causally related capitalist vestiges. Both approaches are 
bound up with, and can only be grasped in relation to, the base-superstructure 
distinction between more and less superficial capitalist vestiges.  
 
We can now conceptualise statist utopianism in light of the preceding analysis. 
Statist utopianism is a distinctive approach to the socialist transition: imposing 
a communist vision on society rather than striving for its realisation. What is the 
methodological essence of this distinction? ‘Striving to realise’ means, I suggest, 
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an organic approach to the socialist transition. With regard to capitalist vestiges, 
the organic approach is to facilitate their disappearance by addressing, first and 
foremost, the underlying capitalist vestiges that give rise to them.  
 
The antithetical approach is to impose the disappearance of capitalist vestiges 
by suppressing the surface effects of underlying capitalist vestiges: ‘running 
ahead’ of the socialist transition by imposing a communist vision. Suppression 
is, then, a form of statist utopianism. What are the implications of statist 
utopian suppression for the socialist transition? Such progress is contrived 
rather than organic, and may simply be illusory. It has a certain artificiality and 
fragility, and is likely to be pyrrhic and ephemeral.  
 
Only certain relatively superficial capitalist vestiges are amenable to state 
suppression. For example, racist organisations can be prohibited, but not the 
racist ideas that inspire them (the state cannot reach inside people’s heads). Nor 
can the material basis of racist ideas—racial inequality—be banned. Other than 
the repeal of racially discriminatory laws, racial inequality can only be 
overcome. Likewise, in Cuba’s 1968 Revolutionary Offensive (see Chapter 2) 
some 58,000 urban small businesses were transformed, at the stroke of a pen, 
into ‘property of the people’. Yet the state could not decree the compatibility of 
centralised management with the atomised nature of such economic niches as 
restaurants, flower stands and watch repairs at the time of nationalisation (and 
in Cuba today). Evidently, the state’s coercive powers are potent only at the 
superstructural level. 
 
Furthermore, relatively superficial capitalist vestiges (the only ones that might 
be amenable to state suppression) are surface effects of any underlying capitalist 
vestiges that give rise to them. If a surface effect is suppressed, then the 
underlying capitalist vestige tends to ‘resurface’ in another form; or in the same 
form if suppression proves unenforceable. In the latter case, suppression is 
merely futile. If the underlying capitalist vestige resurfaces in another form, this 
is an unintended consequence; and unintended consequences are seldom 
serendipitous. If this other form is less desirable than the one that has been 
suppressed, then suppression is worse than futile: it is counterproductive.  
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For example, if money is abolished (or rendered worthless), commodity 
exchange takes the primitive form of barter, a less convenient form. Both the 
money and barter forms are a surface effect of the underdevelopment of the 
productive forces that gives rise to the persistence of commodity production and 
exchange this side of communism: “The survival of money economy and market 
economy is a consequence, not a cause, of the relative shortage of consumer 
goods. ... By abolishing money and market economy one abolishes only the 
barometer, not the frost itself” (Mandel 1974: 633).  
 
Statist utopian suppression grapples with surface phenomena rather than 
underlying causes. The fundamental capitalist vestige, the relatively 
underdeveloped productive forces, cannot be suppressed. For example, 
suppressing private ownership of large capitalist enterprises does not in and of 
itself create the material abundance that is a precondition for communism. At 
best, it unleashes the creativity of a workforce freed from capitalist servitude 
and allows existing means of production to be utilised at full capacity. The 
development of the productive forces is essentially constructive rather than 
suppressive. 
 
The fact that only relatively superficial capitalist vestiges are amenable to 
suppression; and that underlying capitalist vestiges tend to well up in other 
forms (or the same form) if their surface effects are suppressed means that 
statist utopian suppression is contrived progress. It lacks the authenticity and 
solidity of organic progress, whereby relatively superficial capitalist vestiges 
recede more or less in harmony with the withering away of the underlying 
capitalist vestiges that give rise to them. 
 
Statist utopian suppression is not the only conceivable way that the state could 
impose a communist vision on society. In the sphere of socialist construction, 
too, the state can ‘run ahead’ of the socialist transition. I term this ‘constructive’ 
statist utopianism. Whereas the suppressive form subdues superficial vestiges of 
the capitalist past, the constructive form is oriented to a strived-for communist 
future. Like its suppressive counterpart, constructive statist utopianism 
introduces or intensifies an incongruence between causally related capitalist 
vestiges or more generally, an incongruence of the socialist model.  
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Suppressive and constructive statist utopianism may be directly 
complementary. For example, Cuba’s Revolutionary Offensive suppressed the 
remnant urban private sector comprising small businesses and self 
employment.14 From bakeries to watch repairs, the state was obliged to 
substitute for the indispensable economic contributions of this sector to society. 
Suppression had to be complemented by constructive measures, such as 
opening new state-owned and managed restaurants and establishing a state 
supply chain for every bakery in the Cuban archipelago. In terms of the socialist 
transition, this progress was no less contrived than the suppression it 
complemented. One capitalist vestige was vanquished, but another—the state 
‘bureaucracy’—expanded to fill the void.15  
 
Binary exclusivity 
 
Mayra Espina Prieto, professor at Havana University’s Centre for Psychological 
and Sociological Research and a leading Cuban sociologist, perceives 
‘dichotomies’ in Cuba’s social policy and wider socialist development strategy. 
These dichotomies are a consequence of conceiving of social reality and the 
possibilities for state intervention in terms of ‘antagonistic pairs’, and from the 
policy choice of ‘radically excluding’ one term of such a pair rather than striving 
for their complementarity (Espina Prieto 2006: 366). She terms this approach 
the ‘maximalist equality paradigm’. She cites, for example, the state-market 
duality and the Cuban tendency to emphasise the state to the exclusion of the 
market. These dichotomies have paradoxical effects. For example, the Cuban 
state’s almost exclusive emphasis on egalitarian distributional homogeneity 
does not address the heterogeneity of social inequality and disadvantage. 
Paradoxically, egalitarianism can tend to reinforce rather than ameliorate social 
inequality. Universal access and affordability (e.g. Cuban healthcare and 
education at all levels) should be complemented, she argues, by targeted 
assistance and affirmative action (Espina Prieto 2006: 366). 
 
                                                             
14 Whether this was done out of a desire to anticipate communism (and thus whether it 
constitutes statist utopianism) will be taken up in Chapter 2. For now, let us assume for 
argument’s sake that it was.  
  
15 We will elaborate on this argument later.  
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Earlier in this chapter, we cited Raul Castro’s critical reflection on the PCC 
leadership’s attitude to state enterprise budgets, cost accounting, revenues, 
taxes, etc. The PCC leadership viewed these as capitalist vestiges; then went one 
attitudinal step further. It viewed these money-based methods as overly 
capitalist and discouraged their use (cited in Mesa-Lago 1978: 36). In spurning 
the use of such money-based capitalist vestiges, the PCC leadership adopted a 
‘dichotomous approach’ (as Espina Prieto terms it) to economic management in 
relation to the plan–market duality. As we shall see in Chapter 2, PCC leaders 
also demonised material incentives, remnant urban private enterprise and other 
manifestations of the market (i.e. of commodity production and exchange).  
 
Capitalist vestiges embody and symbolise the capitalist past in the present. 
Some have tangible and/or conceptual opposites that embody or symbolise the 
envisioned communist future in the present. Examples of such dualities are 
markets and planning, inequality and egalitarianism, economy and society, 
individualism and collectivism, state and non-state. Two of these dualities seem 
incongruous. Egalitarianism is not equality, but it may come to symbolise a 
commitment to equality. Likewise, the state does not actually embody a strived-
for communist future if communism is conceived as a stateless society, but the 
state may nevertheless come to symbolise communism. Means to an end (such 
as egalitarianism as a means to equality or the proletarian state as a means to a 
stateless society) can become ends in themselves, and acquire a corresponding 
symbolism. There are echoes of Utopian socialism here. Utopian communes, set 
up as models for society to emulate, tended to become ends in themselves.  
 
The corollary of demonising the ‘capitalist’ poles of such dualities is the 
idealisation of their opposites. ‘Planning is good, more planning is better, total 
planning is ideal’ is the attitudinal complement of an aversion to the presence of 
markets or their use by communists in the socialist transition. It might be 
assumed, for example, despite evidence to the contrary or in the absence of 
evidence, that planning that excludes the market must be superior to planning 
that uses the market (e.g. horizontal relations between state enterprises, 
mediated by market exchanges). Yet there are limits to rational planning. 
Experience has shown that “to lay down detailed and complete production 
targets for enterprises ... merely confronts them with insoluble tasks and 
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undermines the principle of the plan more than would a certain degree of 
freedom of action of these same enterprises” (Mandel 1974: 643). 
 
I will refer to an aversion to the presence and use (in some cases, such as 
money) of capitalist vestiges and a corresponding idealisation of their tangible 
or symbolic opposites as ‘binary exclusivity’. This kind of black-and-white 
thinking starts from the premise that X is a capitalist vestige and that Y, its 
opposite, embodies communism. On the basis that these polarities are 
antithetical, it is concluded that socialist construction demands the exclusion of 
the ‘capitalist’ pole as far as possible, i.e. within the constraints of practicality or 
political realism. Exclusivity is a criterion—or even the criterion—of progress. 
The possibility that such opposites could perhaps be complementary vis-à-vis 
communist objectives, and that complementarity rather than exclusivity should 
be the guiding principle, is implicitly dismissed.  
 
The criterion or principle of complementarity strives for the golden mean. For 
example, one should strive for an appropriate balance between planning and the 
market given the actual (rather than contrived) proximity to communism and 
given the historical conjuncture. The golden mean might be, for argument’s 
sake, 70% planning and 30% market. By contrast, the binary exclusivity 
approach (i.e. as little market as practicality or political realism permits) might 
opt for, say, 90% and 10% respectively in the given circumstances.  
 
Here is an illustrative and pertinent example of binary exclusivity. Che Guevara 
viewed material incentives as capitalist vestiges and as the antithesis of moral 
incentives and disincentives (i.e. social approval and disapproval respectively): 
“[M]aterial incentives and consciousness are contradictory terms” (Guevara, C 
cited in Deutschmann 1997: 176). According to Guevara, the socialist transition 
is characterised by “society throwing off its old bonds in order to arrive quickly 
at the new stage”, and so: “The tendency must be, in our opinion, to eliminate as 
vigorously as possible the old categories [i.e. capitalist vestiges], including the 
market, money, and, therefore, the lever of material interest—or, to put it better, 
to eliminate the conditions for their existence” [emphasis in original] (Guevara, 
C cited in Deutschmann 1997: 184).  
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To eliminate the market, money and material incentives ‘as vigorously as 
possible’ requires a heavy dose of statist utopianism. To ‘eliminate the 
conditions for their existence’ requires the antithetical approach: organic 
transcendence. In the passage above, Guevara conflates these two irreconcilable 
approaches. His antipathy to material incentives, based on his conviction that 
they undermine the nurturing of a communist consciousness and morality (see 
Guevara, C cited in Deutschmann 1997: 177), led him down the statist utopian 
path of striving to eliminate these capitalist vestiges (and other closely 
associated ones) as rapidly as possible. Yet Guevara’s realism imposed a limit on 
the possible. He stressed: “[W]e do not deny the objective need for material 
incentives” [emphasis in original] (cited in Deutschmann 1997: 176).  
 
Guevara’s preoccupation with morality draws attention to the moral dimension 
(at least in the Cuban case) of statist utopianism. Morality deals in absolutes: 
right and wrong. Binary exclusivity and morality have a natural affinity because 
both tend to polarise. Morality can guide communist strivings in essentially two 
different ways. The ‘moral compass’ orients to the communist horizon but does 
not seek to impose an ideal of communist morality on society. This approach is 
consistent with Leon Trotsky’s (1938) dictum that “problems of revolutionary 
morality are fused with problems of revolutionary strategy and tactics”.  
 
By contrast, the ‘moral stricture’ approach is to impose an ideal of communist 
morality on society. Appeals to conscience are complemented by a resort to state 
coercion to bend economic and other social relations to conformity with notions 
of communist morality. Cuba’s late 1960s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ 
was imbued with intense moralism; indeed, the suppression of capitalist 
vestiges was posed in moral terms (see Chapter 2). ‘The moral economy of a 
revolutionary society’ is the apt title of a sympathetic 1969 eyewitness account of 
the Cuban Revolution by US sociologist Joseph Kahl (see Kahl 1969). 
 
Enrique Ubieta Gomez, a Cuban Marxist intellectual, perceives two sides to the 
political personality of Jose Marti, the late 19th century Cuban poet, journalist, 
revolutionary leader and national hero. Marti’s intellectual and ‘spiritual’ 
influence on the Cuban Revolution arguably rivals that of Marx, Engels and 
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Lenin. Ubieta (cited in Cameron 2011d) makes “a conceptual differentiation 
between the ‘must be’ and ‘can be’ of Marti”.  
 
[The ‘must be’ of Marti] ignores reality in all of its facets—the visible, the factual, and 
the possible, the latent—to cling to an ideal that is not confirmed in practice, and to 
artificially adjust reality to the model; the [‘can be’ of Marti] starts from the existence 
of different possibilities latent in society, all of them real though not completely 
manifest, and from the certainty that [their] realisation ... can and must be impelled 
in a conscious way [my emphasis] (Ubieta cited in Cameron 2011d).  
 
Marti’s ‘must be’ and ‘can be’ may transcend his personality and the late 19th 
century. Transposed to the socialist transition, his ‘must be’ would be the statist 
utopian impulse to ‘artificially adjust reality’ to, for example, some notion of 
communist morality; his ‘can be’ would be an organic approach to the socialist 
transition. One might be torn between these divergent inclinations, between 
one’s statist utopian impulses and a grounded revolutionary realism. 
 
To recapitulate, we have conceptualised two complementary forms of statist 
utopianism: suppressive and constructive. Both introduce or intensify an 
incongruence between causally related capitalist vestiges, such as by 
emphasising planning to the exclusion of the market. By contrast, the organic 
transcendence approach strives for the complementarity of such dualities vis-à-
vis communist goals, given (1) the proximity (actual rather than contrived) to 
communism; and (2) conjunctural necessities. Binary exclusivity and a ‘moral 
stricture’ approach to communist morality are mutually conducive; and the 
revolutionary psyche may struggle to reconcile utopian and realist inclinations.  
 
Diagnosis  
 
How might the combined influence of suppressive and constructive statist 
utopianism be diagnosed in a socialist model? On the basis of the 
conceptualisation of statist utopianism thus far, we would expect them to 
manifest as incongruences of the model arising from binary exclusivity. Binary 
exclusivity is a certain attitude to capitalist vestiges and their tangible or 
symbolic opposites: the tendency to emphasise one pole of a duality (such as 
planning–market) to the exclusion of the other in anticipation of communism. 
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(Importantly, a socialist model may be incoherent for other reasons. For 
example, circumstantial necessity may compel it. If so, this is not statist 
utopianism. It must be shown that the incongruence of the model arises from 
the imposition of a communist vision on society).  
 
Binary exclusivity tends, in thought and in practice, to the exclusion of one pole 
of some capitalist/communist duality. If such exclusionary desires come up 
against practical limits, then pushing against these limits repeatedly might be 
expected to give rise to characteristic policy zigzags between the assertion of a 
cherished exclusionary principle—e.g. that there should be no private enterprise 
on any scale—and the resort to a reluctant pragmatism. It is not the absence of 
the ‘capitalist’ pole of the duality that is diagnostic of statist utopianism but the 
drive to minimise, marginalise and demonise this pole. 
 
One of Espina Prieto’s observations (cited on page 29) is that what she terms the 
‘maximalist equality paradigm’ has led to a paradox in Cuba: egalitarianism 
perpetuates rather than ameliorates social inequality by treating unequal people 
as if they were equals.16 There is a mismatch here between means and ends. The 
more unequal a society, the less egalitarianism reduces inequality. Ironically, 
egalitarianism has the most egalitarian outcomes in a society that is already 
relatively egalitarian—i.e. a society which has little need for egalitarianism.  
 
Such paradoxes are ‘statist utopian paradoxes’ if arise from binary exclusivity. 
As noted on page 18, the overarching such paradox is that, as Fidel Castro (cited 
in Mesa-Lago 1978: 26) observed in hindsight, the socialist transition should be 
pursued “slowly to arrive quickly”. In terms of statist utopianism, ‘going slowly’ 
means an organic approach to the socialist transition, i.e. an approach guided by 
the principle of complementarity rather than binary exclusivity. As noted on 
page 28, Mandel draws attention to another such paradox by pointing out that 
excessively detailed planning is counterproductive: less planning may be more 
effective planning (Mandel 1974: 643). Such paradoxes exemplify the 
incongruence of the socialist model that binary exclusivity may give rise to. 
 
                                                             
16
 For example, at the time of writing, high-income Cuban households are still entitled 
to the same state-subsidised food rations as low-income households. In effect, the latter 
are subsidising the former thanks to egalitarianism.       
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To recapitulate, the combined influences of suppressive and constructive statist 
utopianism may be diagnosed in a socialist model if it can be shown that it is 
binary exclusivity that has given rise to the observed incongruence of the model. 
Statist utopian paradoxes exemplify such incongruence.  
 
The state and statist utopianism 
 
What are the implications of statist utopianism for the socialist transition and 
the nature of the socialist model? As argued earlier in this chapter, statist 
utopian progress towards communism is contrived and fragile, and is likely to 
be pyrrhic and ephemeral. It may simply be illusory, as when an underlying 
capitalist vestige ‘resurfaces’ in a less desirable form; or when binary exclusivity 
gives rise to such paradoxical absurdities as overzealous planning that 
undermines the effectiveness of planning itself—i.e. when planning becomes an 
end in itself. The contrived or illusory nature of statist utopian progress is the 
key implication of statist utopianism for the socialist transition. 
 
We now turn to its implications for the nature of the socialist model. Statist 
utopianism is defined as imposing a communist vision on society rather than 
striving for its realisation. Striving for its realisation means an organic 
approach: addressing first and foremost the underlying capitalist vestiges that 
give rise to others. This approach is conducive to a relatively harmonious 
withering away of causally related capitalist vestiges—among them the state 
itself. In the organic transcendence approach, the state withers away in step 
with the underlying capitalist vestiges that give rise to it. By contrast, statist 
utopianism delays, decelerates or reverses the withering away of the proletarian 
state. A conceptual-methodological chasm opens up between organic 
transcendence (i.e. actual progress towards communism) and statist utopianism 
(i.e. contrived progress). The chasm between real and contrived progress is 
bridged by the state, i.e. by state institutions and the state’s coercive reach.  
 
Consider statist utopian suppression. To suppress a capitalist vestige (such as 
market relations in agriculture) the state must either prohibit or curtail it. Such 
efforts are only effective to the degree that laws and regulations are enforceable. 
Only the state can enforce its own laws, and enforcement requires a coercive 
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apparatus: inspectors, police, courts, prisons, etc. The state’s coercive apparatus 
might initially be capable of absorbing its new, statist utopian duties, but only 
up to a point. If statist utopian suppression is allowed to take its course, then at 
some point the state’s coercive apparatus will need substantial reinforcement. 
Consider what it might require, for example, to enforce a ban on 200,000 
peasants selling their farm surpluses to anyone other than some state entity. If 
such a ban proves difficult or impossible to enforce due to the corruption of the 
inspectors, then the state can either retreat or send in inspectors to inspect the 
inspectors, and so on. Suppression has it own institutional logic. 
 
Constructive statist utopianism adds another institutional dimension to the 
state’s bridging role: a burgeoning state bureaucracy. To the degree that the 
state is obliged to substitute for the socially indispensable functions of 
suppressed capitalist vestiges, the state apparatus effectively absorbs them. In 
the organic transcendence approach, some of these functions (such as money as 
a convenient means of exchange) wither away, or rather the state facilitates 
their withering away by addressing the underlying capitalist vestiges that give 
rise to them. Other such functions, such as a remnant private sector’s ownership 
of local bakeries, are ‘socialised’ organically rather than artificially by decree.17  
 
Statist utopianism interposes the state’s laws and institutions into the widening 
chasm between withering away and statist utopian suppression. This bridging 
role underscores the contrived nature of statist utopianism: superficial capitalist 
vestiges are vanquished, but another—the state—rushes in (or creeps outwards) 
to fill the void. In effect, one capitalist vestige absorbs others. Engels envisioned 
the withering away of the proletarian state as the conditions for its obsolescence 
matured. Society and state would merge as the state ‘dissolved into’ society. By 
contrast, statist utopianism brings about a contrived merging of state and 
society. The state absorbs, rather than dissolves into, society.  
 
To Trotsky (1991 [1937]: 92), the degree of the state’s dissolution into society “is 
the best index of the depth and efficacy of the socialist construction”. The 
demands of enforcement mean that statist utopian suppression tends in the 
                                                             
17 For example, a first step might be to facilitate a flourishing of cooperatively owned 
and/or managed small and medium-sized economic entities.  
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opposite direction. Constructive statist utopianism compounds this tendency. 
Thus both forms of statist utopinaism tend towards the hyper-statisation of 
social relations (state-centrism) or—in institutional terms—the growth of the 
state’s coercive and administrative apparatuses. There is thus an intrinsic 
connection between statist utopianism and bureaucratisation. 
 
Soviet War Communism 
 
The Soviet experience of War Communism (mid-1918 to early 1921) illustrates 
some key themes of the conceptualisation of statist utopianism in this chapter. 
Drawing on this experience puts my concept to the test and empirically grounds 
and enriches it in the earliest historical expression of this phenomenon. We 
conclude this chapter with a case study in miniature: Soviet War Communism.  
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, statist utopianism (imposing a communist 
vision on society) is not the only conceivable motivation for the state 
suppression of capitalist vestiges. An incongruence between causally related 
capitalist vestiges might arise or be intensified because compelling 
circumstances force the hand of the party-state leadership. Soviet War 
Communism is illustrative. Mandel notes that the programme of the first 
Bolshevik government did not envisage the immediate expropriation of all 
large-scale capitalist enterprises—only the progressive nationalisation of the key 
monopoly-controlled sectors and other transitional measures that would not 
have amounted to a post-capitalist economy.  
 
The wholesale nationalisation of large-scale industry, the suppression of 
commodity production and exchange and state planning of all economic activity 
were obligatory responses to the civil war, foreign military intervention and 
other compelling factors (Mandel 1974: 549). Economic historian Moshe Lewin 
(1975: 76) regards this as the consensus view: “It is generally accepted among 
researchers that the great wave of nationalisations did not begin until the 
outbreak of the Civil War in June 1918, and that this course was not intended”. 
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The sharp turn to what become known as War Communism was an exceedingly 
pragmatic response to dire circumstances.18  
 
Nevertheless, it came to be viewed in the course of events, by Bolshevik leaders 
themselves among others, as something entirely different: a communist ‘great 
leap forward’. The Bolshevik leadership hoped to make a virtue of dire necessity 
and “gradually ... arrive at genuine communism” via War Communism (Trotsky 
1991 [1937]: 20). With Lenin’s endorsement, the text of the 1919 Communist 
Party draft programme called for “the most rapid carrying out of the most 
radical measures preparing the abolition of money” (cited in Nove 1989: 56).19 
War-induced hyperinflation stoked communist desires to make a leap into a 
moneyless economy. Statist utopian illusions flourished: 
 
As money lost all value, private trade was declared illegal and the nationalisation of 
practically all industrial enterprises was undertaken, voices came to be raised among 
the communists that that they were even now in the process of establishing a true 
[communist] economy. ... Money, markets, buying and selling, these characteristics of 
capitalism would swiftly vanish (Nove 1989: 56).  
 
These statist utopian illusions had a theoretical reflection:  
 
[Communist Party leader and theoretician Nicolai Bukharin and his co-thinkers had] 
a Utopian and optimistic set of ideas concerning a leap into [communism], which 
would seem to have little to do with the reality of hunger and cold. Measures that 
made sense, if at all, only in terms of the emergency and disruption [of the Civil War] 
came to be regarded as good in themselves (Nove 1989: 56).  
 
Production declined precipitously under War Communism, not only because of 
the ravages of war, “but also because of the quenching of the stimulus of 
personal interest among the producers” (Trotsky 1991 [1937]: 20). The Soviet 
government dispatched detachments of armed workers to requisition grain from 
                                                             
18 Trotsky (1991 [1937]: 20) gives a more nuanced account, commenting in passing that 
“in its original conception [War Communism] pursued broader aims”. He does not 
substantiate this view.  
 
19 Money could conceivably be abolished, but “so long as the problem of distribution 
remains dominated by the relative shortage of consumer goods, money continues to be 
the most efficient device for carrying out this distribution” (Mandel 1974: 568).  
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the peasants, who saw “little sense in producing farm surpluses that would be 
taken from them by requisition squad” (Nove 1989: 52). In 1920, the output of 
large-scale industry was 13% and steel production a mere 4% of their 1913 levels 
(Mandel 1974: 550). There were 2.6 million workers in 1917 and only 1.2 million 
in 1920 (Nove 1989: 57). The collapse of the productive forces brought the 
country and the Soviet government to “the very edge of the abyss” (Trotsky 1991 
[1937]: 20). 
 
War Communism’s statist utopian illusions had a distinctive political 
psychology rooted in what Lewin (1975: 77) describes as “the strains and 
agonies of the Civil War”. The conditions under which a majority of the 
Bolsheviks were “led to believe that the war economy measures ... offered a 
shortcut to [communism] that had been dubbed a childish ‘leftist’ dream a short 
while before” were the “interplay of action imposed by the contingencies of war 
and the combination of the psychological needs of leaders and followers alike 
engaged in the battle for survival, which only the hope for ‘utopia’ can provide” 
(Lewin 1975: 77). These statist utopian illusions coalesced around “a set of vague 
notions about communism” that “had never been thought out seriously and 
which Marx deliberately left obscure” (Lewin 1975: 77).  
 
Trotsky (1991 [1937]: 20) draws attention to the fluid international context in 
which these false hopes and expectations were aroused: “The utopian hopes of 
the epoch of War Communism were subsequently subjected to a cruel, and in 
many respects just, criticism. The theoretical mistake of the ruling party [is 
explicable only in light of] the expectation of an early victory of the revolution in 
the West”. Had the socialist revolution taken hold in Germany, an industrialised 
country, the Soviet Union could have counted on its solidarity (Trotsky 1991 
[1937]: 20). In that scenario, War Communism as a bridge to communism 
would still have been a statist utopian illusion, but a somewhat lesser illusion. 
 
If War Communism was not initially motivated by statist utopian illusions, a 
statist utopian tinge is evident in the extremism of certain measures that were 
hardly justified by the war effort. By the end of 1920, “even tiny enterprises were 
[being] nationalised” (Lewin 1975: 77). An August 1920 census identified more 
than 37,000 nationalised enterprises, over 5,000 of which employed only one 
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worker: “Many of these ‘enterprises’ were, apparently, windmills! This 
illustrates the fantastic extremes to which nationalisation was pushed ... despite 
the clear impracticability of such action” (Nove 1989: 60).  
 
The statist utopian de-commodification of society peaked in late 1920, as the 
Civil War was drawing to a close on the decisive fronts. The most radical 
measures “were undoubtedly deeply influenced by the [statist utopian] ideology 
which was so widespread among the party” during War Communism (Nove 
1989: 55). Nove (1989: 55) cites Soviet scholar A. Venediktov’s striking 
observation that some of the most extreme measures were taken after the final 
victory of the Red Army in the Civil War.  
 
Opposition to a timely retreat from War Communism, and the fact that the 
Bolshevik party leadership did not immediately recognise the need for a more 
organic approach to the socialist transition—an approach embodied in the New 
Economic Policy that emerged by degrees from March 1921—imbued War 
Communism as a whole with statist utopianism as the Civil War drew to a close. 
Analytically then, statist utopianism is a context-dependent moving target. 
Changing circumstances (such as emergency measures that are no longer 
justified) may invest the same policy with statist utopian content. Today’s 
revolutionary realism may be tomorrow’s statist utopianism. 
 
War Communism illustrates how statist utopianism arises from the nexus 
between circumstances, inexperience, ideology and political psychology in the 
socialist transition. The dire exigencies of the Communist war effort compelled a 
radical suppression of such capitalist vestiges as private ownership of the means 
of production and market relations. This gave rise to compelling statist utopian 
illusions. In turn, these illusions inspired statist utopian suppression at the 
margins, such as the nationalisation of windmills. Pre-Civil War Bolshevik 
notions of a more organic approach to the socialist transition evaporated amid 
the rigours of war. Making a communist virtue of necessity was rationalised and 
theorised by Bolshevik leaders. The importance of symbolism (as in the collapse 
of the rouble being viewed by some as a sign of serendipitous progress towards a 
moneyless, communist society) is highlighted. The inexperience of the political 
leadership also comes to the fore as a decisive factor.  
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Conclusions 
 
Marxist political economy lacks a well-developed concept of utopianism-as-
unrealism in the specific context of the socialist transition. Statist utopianism is 
conceptualised as a distinctive approach to that transition: imposing a 
communist vision on society rather than striving for its realisation. The essence 
of this imposition is explicable in theoretical terms with reference to Marx’s 
base-superstructure distinction and Engels’ conception of the withering away of 
the proletarian state. Two contrasting attitudes to capitalist vestiges—binary 
exclusivity and complementarity—correspond to antithetical approaches to the 
socialist transition: organic transcendence and statist utopianism.  
 
The organic transcendence approach seeks to address, first and foremost, the 
underlying capitalist vestiges that give rise to others. This approach is conducive 
to a relatively harmonious withering away of causally related capitalist vestiges, 
among them the state. Statist utopianism is associated with binary exclusivity: 
antipathy towards certain capitalist vestiges and a corresponding idealisation of 
their tangible or symbolic communist opposites. One pole of a duality (such as 
planning—markets) tends to be emphasised to the exclusion of the other. This 
introduces or intensifies an incongruence between causally related capitalist 
vestiges or more generally, an incongruence of the socialist model.  
 
Statist utopian progress is contrived and fragile (or simply illusory), and is likely 
to be pyrrhic and ephemeral. This contrasts with the authenticity and solidity of 
organic progress towards communism. In the organic approach, the state 
withers away in step with the underlying capitalist vestiges that give rise to it. By 
contrast, statist utopianism has a state-centric dynamic: the state tends to 
‘absorb’ rather than ‘dissolve into’ society. There is thus an intrinsic connection 
between statist utopianism and bureaucratisation. Statist utopianism has 
intrinsic subjective dimensions, among them a distinctive political psychology. 
Statist utopianism arises from the interplay of strivings for communism and 
‘objective’ possibilities and constraints on the socialist transition.   
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Chapter 2: Cuba’s Revolutionary Offensive 
[T]he state is everything, the corner store manager is the state, the one who steals a 
little of the [rationed, state-subsidised] goods from you and sells them to you on the 
black market; the baker who steals the flour and then the bread is worthless, etc.  
 
Alfredo Guevara, Cuban intellectual, 201120  
 
In this chapter, the concept of statist utopianism developed in Chapter 1 will be 
applied to a fleeting yet highly distinctive phase of Cuba’s post-1959 socialist 
transition. It opened in late 1966 with a shift in the official attitude to material 
incentives (i.e. supplementary remuneration tied to output, productivity or 
performance). It closed in mid-1970 after an all-out sugar harvest mobilisation 
failed to reach the target of 10 million tons of cane. In the PCC’s Revolutionary 
Offensive launched in March 1968, the remnant urban private sector comprising 
small businesses and self-employment was suppressed.  
 
I will show that the Revolutionary Offensive was a statist utopian ‘great leap 
forward’: a political-ideological crusade to suppress capitalist vestiges. Unlike 
Soviet War Communism (military necessity tinged with statist utopianism), a 
statist utopian ‘great leap forward’21 is statist utopianism in its purest form—the 
closest approximation to its Weberian ideal type. This purity sharpens the 
contrast between statist utopianism and an organic approach to the socialist 
transition. In the late 1960s, statist utopianism arguably reached its zenith in 
Cuba and left a lasting imprint on Cuba’s socialist model.  
 
From striving for the complementarity of material incentives and moral 
incentives (i.e. social approval or disapproval), the PCC leadership’s approach 
shifted to binary exclusivity: an aversion to certain capitalist vestiges and an 
idealisation of their communist opposites. This had a moral dimension. Material 
incentives were systematically withdrawn in favour of moral incentives to foster 
a communist personality and morality. This was both an end in itself and a 
                                                             
20 Cited in Cameron 2011c. 
 
21 We will retain the scare quotes because such progress towards communism is 
contrived or illusory. 
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means (it was hoped) to rapidly industrialise. Suppressing the urban private 
sector allowed this incentives policy to be applied more consistently. Three 
capitalist vestiges were targeted: material incentives, residual private enterprise 
and associated individualism. I will show that Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap 
forward’ had a state-centric dynamic. This will lay the groundwork for the 
analysis of Cuban state socialism in Chapter 3.  
 
The line of argument is framed historically in a close analysis of selected 
passages from three of Fidel Castro’s speeches.22 Inconsistencies in these 
speeches, some subtle and others glaring, are interpreted in the theoretical-
conceptual framework established in Chapter 1. This historical analysis is then 
further developed thematically. Besides Castro’s authoritative and revealing 
speeches, I draw on a variety of Cuban and other sources, in particular the 
prodigious historical analysis of the Cuban economy by Pittsburgh University’s 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a self-described Keynesian. I will deal briefly with two 
possible objections to my conclusion that Cuba’s Revolutionary Offensive was 
statist utopian and not (as was War Communism) a forced move. 
 
Incentives and consciousness 
 
A shift in the official attitude towards material incentives in late 1966 
foreshadowed the Revolutionary Offensive. This ideological shift is captured by 
juxtaposing two passages from keynote speeches by Fidel Castro in July 1965 
and September 1966 respectively. Castro, who enjoyed immense personal 
authority, was by far the most influential leader of the Cuban Revolution. He 
was prime minister, first secretary of the PCC from its founding in October 1965 
and commander in chief of the armed forces.  
 
In July 1965, Castro presided over the inaugural awards ceremony in which 
some 5,000 macheteros (manual cane cutters) were recognised for their 
outstanding contributions to the sugar harvest. Each had chosen a prize from 
among those on offer: holidays abroad, refrigerators, motorcycles, etc. Castro 
referred to these as moral prizes because the social recognition they conferred is 
“much more valuable than the material prize they are going to receive”. While 
                                                             
22 See Castro, F 1965, 1966 and 1968a.  
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acknowledging that consumer goods would no doubt be well received by the 
workers and their families, he stressed their symbolic significance as tokens of 
social gratitude: “That material prize is an expression of this moral recognition. 
The people ... offer them a small sacrifice made by the nation to express ... their 
appreciation” (Castro, F 1965).23  
 
Somewhat less symbolically, Castro suggested that the awards programme be 
extended to allow recipients to accumulate points towards higher retirement 
pensions. He announced that in the 1966 harvest, in addition to 100 overseas 
holidays with up to two family members, 1,250 motorcycles with sidecars, 1,750 
refrigerators and 2,000 family holidays at Cuba’s Varadero beach, new prizes 
would include 100 cars and 100 purpose-built houses (Castro, F 1965). 
 
Sugar was the basis of the Cuban economy, Castro said, so it was “logical that we 
offer incentives in those jobs which benefit us the most”. Until the harvest could 
be mechanised, it was also “one of the hardest jobs”. It was only fair, then, that 
“those who work the most receive the most”. He stressed that every effort must 
be made to discourage selfishness. He noted approvingly that while 500 
overseas holidays had been offered to outstanding macheteros, only 80 had 
chosen this option despite it being the most valuable prize. Only the recipient 
was eligible for a holiday, and most chose prizes that would benefit not only 
themselves but also their families. Nevertheless:  
 
It would be absurd for us to expect that these men who earn their daily bread cutting 
cane [would] make a maximum effort [if we were to start] telling them that they 
should do this as a duty without being interested in whether they are going to earn 
more or less. This would be idealistic (Castro, F 1965). 
 
Fourteen months later, in September 1966, Castro returned to the theme of 
moral and material incentives. Citing as an example the managers of state-
owned enterprises enticing workers away from other such enterprises with the 
inducement of higher wages, he commented:  
 
                                                             
23 To avoid repetition, citations of Fidel Castro’s speeches in this chapter refer to the 
paragraph as a whole.  
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[W]hoever wants to resolve problems by appealing to individual egoism, by appealing 
to individual effort to resolve their problems, forgetting about society ... would be 
acting in a reactionary manner. They would be conspiring ... against the possibility of 
forging in the people a truly socialist, truly communist, consciousness (Castro, F 
1966).  
 
The juxtaposition of these two passages draws attention to the shift in attitude. 
In the first, Castro implies that material incentives cannot be renounced 
because a sense of social duty does not motivate all citizens—only a socially 
aware and committed minority—to contribute their labour to society to the best 
of their ability. Though far from being an explicit appeal to individual material 
self-interest, this was nonetheless a tacit endorsement of, and thus an implicit 
appeal to, individual effort for personal material gain that also benefits society. 
In the second passage, Castro implies that individual material self-interest and 
the class interests of working people cannot be reconciled through the use of 
material incentives. Appeals to individual material self-interest, such as one 
state enterprise offering higher wages than another, cannot be permitted 
because they undermine communist consciousness.24  
 
The 1965 sugar harvest awards were neither material nor moral incentives as 
such, but a combination of the two. Unlike such purely symbolic moral 
incentives as medals, ribbons and certificates that confer social recognition, 
durable consumer goods such as housing satisfy material needs and desires. 
However, the social recognition attached to these prizes meant that they were 
not only material incentives to productivity, but also moral incentives to 
exemplarity. Having internalised a devotion to the communist cause, a 
committed minority might feel sufficiently motivated by appeals to conscience 
and the prospect of social recognition (or disapproval) to strive for an exemplary 
social contribution—without the added inducement of fraternal competitions for 
consumer goods and holidays. Yet since they and their dependents have 
material needs that must be satisfied, there is no reason to assume that they 
would (or should) be unmoved in the face of such material inducements.  
                                                             
24 In the context of the Cuban Revolution the Spanish noun conciencia, usually 
translated as (social) consciousness, is better understood as “an amalgam of 
consciousness, conscience, conscientiousness and commitment” (Kahl 1969: 30, 31). 
Throughout, I will use the term ‘consciousness’ in this many-sided sense.  
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Those less committed to the cause might be motivated more by the material 
inducements than the prospect of social recognition. Nevertheless, in striving to 
win a prize and (if they do so) basking in the appreciation it confers, their 
identification with the communist cause and its solidarity ethic is likely to be 
enhanced rather than harmed. This approach could potentially appeal to a 
broad spectrum of social motivation—not only those receptive to appeals to 
conscience. It assumed that while material and moral incentives are different in 
kind, they can be complementary if appropriately combined. In the case of the 
1965 sugar harvest awards, that complementarity was expressed in the moral-
material dualism of the prizes themselves: material rewards that conferred pro-
communist social recognition.  
 
By late 1966, that assumption had given way to the official view that material 
incentives should be rapidly and systematically withdrawn in order to spur the 
emergence of a communist personality and morality. The main report to the 
Twelfth Congress of Cuba’s PCC-led trade union confederation, the CTC, held in 
late August 1966, stressed the need to forge a communist New Human Being25 
and “harshly attacked the line of thinking that favor[ed] materialistic formulas” 
(Mesa-Lago 1972: 68). Castro’s closing speech to the CTC Congress reaffirmed 
this line, and announced that the inaugural PCC congress, scheduled for 1967, 
would resolve the incentives question (Mesa-Lago 1972: 68). The PCC congress 
was delayed until 1975, but the new line was nonetheless implemented.  
 
The socialist emulation plan drawn up by the PCC and the CTC in the wake of 
the 1966 CTC Congress “eliminated every kind of material reward” (Mesa-Lago 
1972: 68). In December 1966, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez—a PCC Central 
Committee member and the secretary of the pro-Soviet Popular Socialist Party 
prior to its absorption into the PCC-in-formation—commented that while the 
PCC line was to give “absolute preference” to moral incentives, there was not 
unanimity among the Cuban leadership regarding this approach (Mesa-Lago 
1972: 69). Throughout 1967, there was “a gradual elimination of those material 
incentives that still remained in the system of production” (Mesa-Lago 1972: 
69). Consumer goods and holidays were withdrawn from socialist emulation 
                                                             
25 This is a gender-neutral rendering. The Spanish el Hombre Nuevo is usually 
translated as ‘the New Man’. 
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campaigns in the sugar harvest; a trial was initiated in an important cement 
factory to wind back incentive payments for the overfulfillment of work norms, 
with a view to their elimination; state farm workers were deprived of their small 
subsistence plots; and “the planning system was centralised even more, 
eliminating all traces of self-financing in [state] enterprises” (Mesa-Lago 1972: 
69). 
 
Agriculture was not exempt. At the end of 1967, the National Association of 
Small Farmers agreed to end the sale of farm and dairy produce on the open 
market in favour of sales to state agencies at fixed prices. In January 1968, 
Castro announced that some 90% of peasant farmers in the Havana Green Belt, 
a ring of farmland surrounding the Cuban capital, had withdrawn from 
commercial distribution. Between 1967 and 1969, some 12,000 private farms 
were sold to the state (Mesa-Lago 1972: 70). 
 
The persuasion of force 
 
Castro announced the Revolutionary Offensive in a March 13, 1968 speech. He 
began by appealing to radicalism: “If we can reproach this Revolution for 
anything ... [it is] for not having been sufficiently radical”. There remained a 
privileged stratum that lived off the labour of others. Citing a detailed PCC 
investigative report, he accused the urban small business and self-employed 
sector of profiteering, black marketeering, operating illegally, cultivating 
antisocial clientele, employer parasitism (owners that did not contribute any 
labour to their businesses), poor service and hygiene, taking children out of 
school and ideological disloyalty to the Revolution, as in the “bad revolutionary 
attitude of both [bar] owners and employees”. Havana’s 955 bars were “making 
money hand over fist”. The PCC report recommended that they be taken over by 
the state or closed down (Castro, F 1968a). 
 
Of 2,056 small business owners in Havana, the highest incidence (95%) of those 
“not participating in the Revolution” was to be found among the proprietors of 
fried food stands. On the basis of their non-participation in the PCC-led mass 
organisations—not participation in subversive activities—Castro described these 
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vendors as “counterrevolutionaries”.26 In the San Jose district of what is today 
Mayabeque Province, where the corresponding non-participation rate was 81%, 
all 18 vendors from whom data was collected were classified as “antisocial and 
amoral elements”. The PCC report, Castro said, urged a “gradual suppression” of 
these micro-enterprises and an “absolute prohibition” on the establishment of 
new ones. This approach would not be limited to bars and fried food stands. The 
Damoclean swords of expropriation and suppression would hang over the entire 
urban private sector:  
 
In a clear and decisive manner we must say that we intend to eliminate all 
manifestations of private business. ... [T]here will be no future in this nation for 
private business, the self-employed, private industry (Castro, F 1968a).  
 
Castro claimed that “capitalism” (i.e. small-scale private enterprise in the 
interstices of Cuba’s state-dominated, post-capitalist economy) was “trying to 
crop up again everywhere” in the guise of both legal and illicit private 
enterprises, appearing alongside inadequacies in the state sector’s provision of 
goods and services. Some 37% of small private businesses in Havana had been 
established after the 1959 revolution. He further claimed that: “Whoever says 
that capitalism has been discouraged is lying. Capitalism has to be uprooted!” 
He announced a threefold approach: the state sector would offer more and 
better goods and services, there would be a crackdown on the black market and 
the urban private sector would be suppressed (Castro, F 1968a).  
 
Self-employment, Castro claimed, was a form of exploitation of workers by the 
self-employed, who paid nothing for free social services. The self-employed 
should “pay for the hospital, the school, let them pay for everything”. This 
rhetorical allusion to taxation is the sole reference in Castro’s speech to possible 
alternatives to expropriation and prohibition—such as taxation, regulation, the 
enforcement of service and hygiene standards, facilitating the emergence of 
cooperatively owned and/or managed enterprises, etc. Turning to the theme of 
selfishness and solidarity, Castro declared:  
                                                             
26 This characterisation was based on self-reported attitudes: “The greatest percentage 
of those who were not participating in the [R]evolution was among the owners of fried 
food stands, where out of 51 individuals who reported the information, 39 of them, 95.1 
percent, were counterrevolutionaries” (Castro, F 1968a). 
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We simply cannot encourage or even permit selfish attitudes in a person unless we 
want them to follow their instincts of selfishness and individuality... The concept of 
communism and socialism, the concept of a superior society entails a person free of 
such attitudes, someone who has risen above these attitudes (Castro, F 1968a). 
 
Let us take a parenthetic magnifying glass to this passage. Castro says here that 
a communist society is one in which people are free of selfish attitudes, and that 
one becomes free of them by rising above them. To rise above something one 
must struggle to subdue it. The individual frees herself from her own selfish 
attitudes (with the help of the society that is changing around her). That 
freedom is ultimately won or lost in the conscience and cannot be imposed from 
without.27 Snatching away the livelihood of the shopkeeper is more likely to 
arouse bitterness than solidarity in the dispossessed; it is the force of 
persuasion, not the persuasion of force, that nurtures the solidarity ethic. Che 
Guevara (cited in Deutschmann 1997: 201) aptly observes: “On the one side, 
society acts through direct and indirect education; on the other, the individual 
submits to a conscious process of self-education”. Yet Castro also says—in the 
same passage cited above—that selfish attitudes cannot even be permitted, 
which means they must be suppressed. Note that Castro conflates individuality 
and individualism (selfishness).28  
 
Moral and material incentives had been debated in terms of Marxist theory and 
methods, Castro said, but it was actually “a far deeper matter” concerning 
morality: “We do not want a communist man or woman to be moulded by 
stimulating their greed, their individualism”. This was not only a matter of 
principle, but also a pragmatic necessity. Given a legacy of colonial and 
neocolonial plunder, “the last centavo” must be invested productively, not spent 
on “superfluous things”. Should cash be handed out as incentives “even if 
nothing can be bought with it?” The Revolution could not match the material 
inducements of imperialist societies such as the US, with an average income “six 
                                                             
27 Nor can selfishness be mechanistically inferred from social being in the individual 
case: a politically backward worker may harbour more selfishness than an enlightened 
petit-bourgeois; and individuals may ‘rise above’ their class origins and dedicate their 
lives to the proletarian cause. Fidel Castro, the son of a landowner, is a case in point.  
 
28 This conflation is not an artefact of translation. The official Spanish transcript of 
Castro’s speech (see Castro, F 1968c) confirms that the English translation cited here is 
accurate in this regard.  
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or seven times” that of Cuba. It should try to close that developmental chasm by 
other means (Castro, F 1968a).  
 
Under the headings ‘The objectives of the Revolutionary Offensive’ and ‘Nation’s 
private sector now almost completely nationalized’, the April 7, 1968 edition of 
Granma Weekly Review (cited in Mesa-Lago 1969: 203, 215), a PCC 
publication, reported that 55,636 urban small businesses had been expropriated 
by government decree. Members of the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution, mostly home-based women, had been appointed the new managers 
of the two thirds of expropriated enterprises that continued to operate. Former 
owners could opt to remain as employees of their confiscated businesses or 
accept other state-sector job offers (Mesa-Lago 1969: 203).  
 
Granma (cited in Mesa-Lago 1969: 203) reported that 31% of expropriated 
enterprises were food retailers such as corner stores, butcher shops, fish shops 
and fruit and vegetable stands. Another 26% were service entities such as barber 
shops, boarding houses, laundrettes, shoe repair shops and automotive 
workshops; 21% were bars, restaurants and the like; and 17% were retail 
businesses selling such merchandise as books, shoes, clothing, furniture, 
flowers, tobacco, hardware and electrical appliances. The remaining 5% were 
small artisanal and manufacturing enterprises. Under ‘We are socialists’ in the 
same edition, Granma (cited in Mesa-Lago 1969: 204, 215) noted with approval 
that “Cuba has thus become the socialist country with the highest percentage of 
state-owned property”.  
 
In 1969, Mesa-Lago (1969: 203) observed: “With the recession of the 
nationalisation tide, the only private [enterprise] that remains is concentrated 
in the agricultural sector, where 200,000 small farmers still own 30% of the 
arable land”. His tabulation, based on data from official Cuban sources, is 
reproduced as Table 1 (collectivisation here is synonymous with state 
ownership).  
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Table 1: The collectivisation process in Cuba 
 
 
Economic sectors 
Percentage  
collectivised 
1962 1964 1968 
Agriculture 37 70 70 
Industry 85 95 100 
Construction 80 98 100 
Transportation 92 95 100 
Retail trade 52 75 100 
Wholesale and foreign trade 100 100 100 
Banking 100 100 100 
Education 100 100 100 
Source: Mesa-Lago 1969: 204 
 
The Cuban sources for Mesa-Lago’s tabulation are inaccessible, and it is not 
clear whether these percentages refer to the number of entities, the number of 
employees or some other measure. The 70% of the agricultural sector in state 
hands in 1964–8 is consistent with Mesa-Lago’s observation cited above that in 
1969, 30% of agricultural land belonged to peasant farmers. Nevertheless, 100% 
state ownership is unambiguous and, assuming the accuracy of the data, outside 
of agriculture the private sector had been expropriated and prohibited to within 
one percent of totality in key sectors.  
 
Let us retrace our steps. In mid-1965, Fidel Castro (1965) said that material 
incentives (their implicit appeal to individual self-interest notwithstanding) 
could not be renounced, because to do so would be “idealistic” and unjust. 
Echoing Marx’s (1977 [1891]) Critique of the Gotha Programme,29 he said that 
                                                             
29 Marx distinguishes between socialist transitional and communist approaches to 
distribution. For the duration of the socialist transition, social inequality arising from 
unequal individual labour contributions must be upheld, because entitlement “can 
never be higher than the economic structure of society”. From the ‘total social product’, 
Marx makes various deductions, among them “that which is intended for the common 
satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, etc. From the outset, this part ... 
grows in proportion as the new society develops”. Another deduction is made for “those 
unable to work, etc.” His principle ‘to each according to their work’ during the 
transition applies, then, only to remuneration, the importance of which diminishes in 
step with the expanding sphere of cost-free, needs-based distribution of consumer 
goods and services (Marx 1977 [1891]: 17).  
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such incentives were necessary to ensure that “those who work the most receive 
the most” (Castro, F 1965). In late 1966, official ideology shifted against material 
incentives on the basis that they promote individualism. During 1967, such 
incentives began to be systematically withdrawn. In early 1968, the 
Revolutionary Offensive was launched as “a [social] movement directed toward 
eradicating selfishness and all remaining manifestations of individualism” 
(Mesa-Lago 1972: 71).  
 
In 1965, Castro had sought to imbue material incentives (and remuneration in 
general) with a socialist transitional moral-ideological content. Remuneration 
should be viewed not solely as callous cash payment30—a calculated transaction 
between buyers and sellers of commodified labour power—but as something 
else besides: the material embodiment of society’s recognition of the fulfilment 
of a social duty. By acting on this perception, the individual could begin to free 
themselves from individualism by cultivating other, nobler work motivations. In 
late 1966, however, Castro denounced all appeals to individual self-interest as 
reactionary. The withdrawal of material incentives was effected through the 
Cuban state’s near monopoly on ownership and management of productive 
property.  
 
That monopoly was consolidated in the Revolutionary Offensive’s 
expropriations and prohibitions, which allowed the PCC’s line on incentives to 
be applied more consistently. The profit motive that reigned in the private 
sector was an analogue of material incentives in the state sector. With what 
moral authority could the PCC persuade the working class to relinquish material 
incentives if the petit-bourgeoisie and self-employment were allowed to 
continue to exist, and even thrive? Raul Castro, then defence minister and 
deputy PCC secretary, made this connection explicit in a speech on May Day in 
1968: “To say that the [urban petit-bourgeoisie] lived better because they were 
influenced by material incentives is true. And, for that very reason we reject 
material incentives. We don’t want a [petit-bourgeois individualist] mentality 
for our people” (cited in Mesa-Lago 1969: 210).  
 
                                                             
30 In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1977 [1848]: 111) observe that under 
capitalism, there is “no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, 
than callous ‘cash payment’”. 
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Statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ 
 
The Revolutionary Offensive was a statist utopian ‘great leap forward’: a 
political-ideological crusade to suppress capitalist vestiges. It almost completely 
suppressed remnant non-agricultural private enterprise in a Third World 
society that had barely emerged from capitalism. This contrasted sharply with 
an organic approach to the socialist transition.   
 
At the dawn of the socialist transition, the proletarian state progressively 
expropriates large capitalist enterprises. “Large-scale capitalist production 
creates the preconditions for socialising [ownership of] and consciously 
planning the economy” (Mandel 1974: 646). When this wave of expropriation 
reaches a tipping point, capitalism is superseded by a post-capitalist economy 
and society, and remnant private enterprise on any scale becomes, arguably, a 
capitalist vestige. Up to a certain point, further expropriations, proceeding from 
large to somewhat smaller enterprises, bring property relations into greater 
harmony—by abolishing private ownership—with the social character of the 
labour process. It is this ‘objective socialisation of labour’ (see Mandel 1986: 5) 
that makes private ownership anachronistic.  
 
Beyond a certain point, further expropriations begin to have the opposite effect. 
They impose the proletarian state property form (at best, a transitional form of 
communist social property) on myriad small and tiny economic entities. This 
introduces, rather than resolves, an incongruence between the productive forces 
and relations embodied in scarcely socialised labour and the corresponding 
property relations. Insofar as expropriation (and associated state coercion) 
tends to harmonise production and property relations, it serves an organic 
approach. Insofar as expropriation introduces or intensifies an incongruence 
between these basis and superstructural social relations, expropriation 
constitutes the suppression of a superficial capitalist vestige: private 
ownership.31 This illustrates the distinction between these two approaches.  
 
                                                             
31 Such an incongruence can arise or be intensified through inertia. The fact that 
circumstances change and state policies do not change accordingly may lend an 
approach to the socialist transition a suppressive character. In Chapter 1, it was argued 
that Soviet War Communism is a striking example of such circumstantial suppression. 
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Note that the state, in its zeal for expropriation, could pass from organic 
transcendence to suppression without the party-state leadership even being 
aware of it, because these approaches are not sharply delineated at the crossover 
point. Only if its own expropriation momentum carries the state further does 
the distinction between them become glaring. The elasticity of the base-
superstructure correspondence (there is no mechanistic correspondence) makes 
suppression possible, and relatively innocuous up to a point; the limits of this 
elasticity give rise to the implications of statist utopian suppression for the 
socialist transition and for the socialist model (see Chapter 1).  
 
A case could be made that the PCC’s drift into statist utopian suppression in the 
economic sphere preceded the Revolutionary Offensive by several years. As early 
as 1964, further incursions into private ownership may have had a utopian 
tinge. Omar Everleny Perez (cited in Hernandez et al 2008: 102), chair of 
Havana University’s Centre for Research on the Cuban Economy, observes that 
‘socialism’ became equated with statism: “We really fell into this confusion in 
1964–5 in continuing with the process of nationalisations”. In other words, 
nationalisation acquired a self-perpetuating dynamic and became an end in 
itself.  
 
Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ targeted three relatively superficial 
capitalist vestiges: material incentives, remnant private enterprise and their 
associated individualism. The shift in official ideology and policy regarding the 
use of material incentives, between mid-1965 and late 1966, was a shift from 
complementarity (material incentives and moral incentives can be 
complementary vis-à-vis the twin goals of productivity and consciousness) to 
binary exclusivity (being antithetical, material and moral incentives are 
mutually exclusive, so material incentives must be systematically withdrawn). 
The state suppression of remnant urban private enterprise extended the reach 
of this logic and applied the new incentives policy more consistently.  
 
There was a moral dimension to this binary exclusivity. The persistence of 
material incentives and the urban private sector was posed in terms of 
communist morality. A society free of selfishness became a moral stricture that 
society must be made to conform to, rather than a moral compass that orients to 
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the communist horizon. Through the distorting lens of this moral stricture, 
‘counterrevolutionary’ applied not only to participants in counterrevolutionary 
activities but also, absurdly, to non-participants in the official mass 
organisations; capitalism was not the social domination of capital based on state 
power and capitalist property, but the mere existence of private enterprise on 
the smallest of scales; individualism and individuality seemed identical; selfish 
attitudes could be banished by decree; and the self-employed, who do not 
employ anyone, were supposedly an exploiting class.32  
 
The Revolutionary Offensive was a moral as well as an ideological crusade. Its 
moral intensity was expressed in such measures as the closure of all bars and 
nightclubs and the prohibitions on men sporting long hair or beards (Fidel 
Castro’s notwithstanding) and on women and girls wearing mini-skirts (Mesa-
Lago 1969: 210, 212). In posing a litany of grievances against the urban private 
sector in existential terms (the existence or non-existence of small-scale private 
enterprise), a concrete question of communist strategy and tactics, in a post-
capitalist society that had barely emerged from capitalism, was dissolved into 
the ahistorical abstraction of a timeless communist morality. 
 
What distinguished the Cuban approach, Fidel Castro claimed in July 1968, was 
that “every step forward of the productive forces must be accompanied by an 
advance in ... consciousness” [my emphasis]. This gives the withering away of 
the fundamental capitalist vestige, the underdevelopment of the productive 
forces, the leading edge in this dialectic. Yet the Revolutionary Offensive 
proceeded as if consciousness were the leading edge: it ‘moralised’ economic 
relations in order to foster the desired consciousness. In turn, this would (it was 
hoped) catalyse rapid industrialisation. At odds with the above citation, Castro 
expressed this inversion in the same speech: “Communism certainly cannot be 
established ... unless abundant riches are created, but in our judgement the 
[way forward] is not to create awareness with money or riches, but to create 
riches with awareness” (Castro, F 1968b).  
 
                                                             
32 The self-employed may not pay their fair share for free or subsidised social services, 
but that is another question. It could have been addressed through taxation.  
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In the late 1960s, the PCC leadership imagined that these twin transformations 
of the economy and consciousness would be telescoped into a very short time 
frame. Veteran Cuban economist Joaquin Infante Ugarte (cited in Cameron 
2010), a contemporary of Che Guevara, recalls: “In 1967, when we stopped cost 
accounting [in state enterprises] and ignored many economic laws, we thought 
we were going to have the New Human Being. Yet human beings with small 
letters must be [materially] incentivised to work. We forgot about the socialist 
law of distribution”. Infante Ugarte alludes here to Marx’s socialist transition 
remuneration principle, ‘to each according to their work’.  
 
It seemed to the PCC leadership that the root cause of the attitudes and conduct 
documented in the PCC report cited by Castro in his March 13, 1968 speech was 
the profit-seeking acquisitiveness of the petit-bourgeoisie (Castro F, 1968a). 
This, together with its atomised and precarious class existence and its 
intermediate social position vis-à-vis the dispossessed bourgeoisie, engenders a 
characteristic individualism. Dispossess the shopkeeper and (it was assumed) 
the mentality engendered by their livelihood would cease to be reproduced; it 
would persist solely as the psychological residue of a vanquished class. 
Education, ideology and emulation would dispel it from the Cuban psyche. 
 
That assumption turned out to be mistaken. The individualistic mentality 
persisted in the guise of indifferent or corrupt administrators of small and tiny 
state-owned economic entities. Cuban Economic Law Society president Narciso 
Cobo Roura (cited in Acanda Gonzalez et al 2007: 138) observes that the Cuban 
baker who sells flour on the black market “disposes of the [state-owned] 
bakery’s resources ... as if he were its owner” [my emphasis]. The state is then 
obliged to “send in an inspector, then find another inspector to watch over the 
first inspector, and so on until you end up with a bureaucracy” (Lesnik cited in 
Cameron 2011a). An April 9, 2010 Granma letter to the editor opined: 
“Following their nationalisation by the Cuban state in 1968, small businesses 
and retail trade were converted, little by little, into a source of illicit profit, theft 
from the state, inefficiency and maltreatment. This is not a recent phenomenon” 
(Paez del Amo 2009).  
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Everleny Perez (cited in Hernandez et al 2008: 102, 106) points out that state 
ownership and management did not make the proprietors of Cuba’s bars any 
more pro-Revolution. Juan Triana Cordovi, also from Havana University’s 
Centre for Research on the Cuban Economy, draws attention to a statist utopian 
paradox: excessive statisation weakens, rather than strengthens, the state’s grip 
on the economy: “We nationalised everything, statised everything down to the 
shoeshiners, and we imposed a burden on the state that it was never able to 
bear” (Triana Cordovi 2013). Burdened with the management of small and tiny 
enterprises, the state was unable to concentrate its efforts on the decisive 
sectors of the national economy.  
 
Binary exclusivity tends to come up against real-world constraints (see Chapter 
1). Even at the climax of Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’, the gigantic 
1970 sugar harvest mobilisation, material incentives were not entirely dispensed 
with. Professional macheteros “received higher, guaranteed annual wage rates” 
(Malloy 1974: 40). Nor did the 1968 wave of expropriations spill over into 
peasant agriculture. Political realism stopped them at the farm gate. Four 
factors likely contributed to the PCC’s pragmatism in this regard: the role of the 
peasantry in the 1959 revolution; the Agrarian Reform Laws that gave peasants 
legal title to the land they farmed, thus consolidating their support for the 
Revolution; Fidel Castro’s pre-Revolution pledge that peasants would never be 
forcibly expropriated; and the disproportionate contribution of peasant farming 
to Cuban agricultural production and food security.  
 
In closing the 1966 CTC Congress, Fidel Castro (1966) commented: “Under 
socialism, or rather under communism, it is said that the state should 
disappear. The state is conceived as a coercive force. Engels said that the 
government of people would be replaced by the administration of things. That is 
the society we want to arrive at”. Ironically, then, as the state’s administrative 
apparatus occupied myriad economic niches vacated by the 1968 suppression of 
the urban private sector, it became monopolistic and nearly all-pervasive in the 
economic sphere. Meanwhile, its coercive reach extended to trying to suppress 
any trace of private enterprise from re-emerging.  
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In 2011, outspoken Cuban intellectual Alfredo Guevara, the founder of Cuba’s 
film institute and a PCC member, pointed out that the Cuban Revolution faced 
the task of dismantling “this huge [state] apparatus which has seized society”: 
 
[T]he state is everything, the corner store manager is the state, the one who steals a 
little of the [rationed, state-subsidised] goods from you and sells them to you on the 
black market; the baker who steals the flour and then the bread is worthless, etc. 
(Guevara, A cited in Cameron 2011c).  
 
The state-centric dynamic of the Revolutionary Offensive was not confined to 
property relations. Party and state functions merged (Diaz Vazquez 2011: 124). 
State enterprises lost all vestiges of autonomy, drawing all their funds from and 
surrendering all their earnings to state coffers (Bernardo 1974: 196). Cuba was 
far from communism, yet trade unions “practically disappeared” from 1966 on 
the basis that there would be no need for them under communism (Morales 
Garza 2008: 96; see also Hernandez and Mesa-Lago 1974). As society was 
‘moralised’, it was also militarised (Malloy 1974: 41). Granma (cited in Mesa-
Lago 1969: 205) reported on April 14, 1968 that preparations for a “war 
economy” were underway in Oriente Province, with “troops of workers” to be 
sent to the “production front”.  
 
It might be objected that perhaps dire circumstances forced the hand of the PCC 
leadership (as was the case with the Soviet leadership’s adoption of War 
Communism). If so, then neither the withdrawal of material incentives nor the 
1968 expropriations can be attributed largely to statist utopianism. As noted 
earlier, Fidel Castro (1968a) claimed that as well as being a matter of principle, 
Cuba could not afford material incentives and economic development 
simultaneously. This is not credible and appears to be a post-hoc rationalisation 
of the consciousness-morality argument.  
 
It is undeniable that investment had to be prioritised, and indeed it was. State 
investments as a percentage of gross material product increased, according to 
official statistics, from 16.4% in 1962 to 22.8% in 1966, 27.4% in 1967 and 31% 
in 1968 (Brundenius 1989: 119). The PCC could have opted to maintain this 
ratio at 1967 levels and redirect the savings from foregone investments to 
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material incentives—such as those that had been withdrawn—or to reallocate 
funds from elsewhere for this purpose. Zeitlin (1970: 11) observed that in 1969, 
and unlike in 1962, “the present austerity, say government leaders, is planned. 
It is the result of the extraordinary and unprecedented rate of investment, 31% 
per cent of the Gross Material Product ... and of the use of scarce foreign 
exchange to buy capital goods rather than consumer goods” [my emphasis]. If it 
was planned, then it could have been avoided.  
 
Was national security or political stability the real reason for the suppression of 
the urban private sector? In his March 13, 1968 speech, Castro accused many in 
the private sector of having apolitical or counterrevolutionary attitudes (Castro, 
F 1968a). The PCC investigative report that Castro cited from would have seized 
on any evidence of widespread involvement in or sponsorship of 
counterrevolutionary activities to make the case for expropriation, and Castro 
would have drawn attention to this. It would stretch plausibility to breaking 
point to suggest that bar owners, florists, shoeshiners, hot-dog stand proprietors 
and the like were a threat to political stability. The ease with which the 
Revolutionary Offensive suppressed the entire sector almost overnight reveals a 
relationship of forces overwhelmingly in favour of the PCC and the state. Far 
from being a sign of political weakness, it would appear to be a sign of strength. 
 
Finally, as noted on page 46, the PCC leadership was divided over the systematic 
withdrawal of material incentives in favour of moral incentives. While Castro’s 
view at the time and that of the majority of the leadership prevailed, a minority 
advocated a different approach—echoes, behind closed doors, of the mid-1960s 
‘Great Debate’ (see Yaffe 2009: 46-59) on moral and material incentives and 
economic management in Cuba’s socialist transition. That the PCC leadership 
was divided over its incentives policy lends weight to the conclusion that the 
Revolutionary Offensive was not a forced move dictated by dire circumstances, 
as was War Communism. A different approach was possible.        
  
Conclusions 
 
The Revolutionary Offensive was a statist utopian ‘great leap forward’. A shift in 
the official attitude to material incentives in late 1966 foreshadowed the 1968 
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suppression of the remnant urban private sector. My subsidiary concept of 
binary exclusivity helps to explain this shift in terms of statist utopianism. It 
was a shift from complementarity (material incentives and moral incentives can 
be complementary vis-à-vis the twin goals of productivity and consciousness) to 
binary exclusivity (being antithetical, material and moral incentives are 
mutually exclusive so material incentives must be systematically withdrawn). 
Inconsistencies in the official rationale for the withdrawal of material incentives 
and for the suppression of remnant urban private enterprise draw attention to 
the distorting effects of viewing society through a lens of binary exclusivity.  
 
From a moral compass orienting to the communist horizon, morality became a 
stricture that society must be made to conform to. The suppression of the urban 
private sector had a state-centric dynamic: in the wake of the Revolutionary 
Offensive’s expropriations and prohibitions, the dominance of state ownership 
and management of the economy was near-absolute. Unlike War Communism, 
the Revolutionary Offensive was not obligatory. 
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Chapter 3: Cuban state socialism 
The [late 2010] authorisation of the hiring of labour and with it, explicit official 
recognition of the existence of pockets of private capitalist property—at least on the 
scale of the micro-enterprise—is one of the most significant conceptual 
transformations of the past 50 years.  
 
Fernandez Estrada, Cuban planning specialist, 201133 
 
Chapter 1 was dedicated to conceptualising statist utopianism as a distinctive 
approach to the socialist transition: imposing a communist vision on society 
rather than striving for its realisation. In Chapter 2, this conceptualisation was 
applied to an analysis of a fleeting yet highly distinctive phase of Cuba’s socialist 
transition in the late 1960s. In this chapter, I apply the concept of statist 
utopianism to an analysis of the prevailing Cuban socialist model.  
 
By ‘model’ I mean a relatively durable core of concepts, methods, institutions 
and mentalities. The notion of the model draws attention to the distinction 
between less and more fundamental changes: changes within a model and a 
change of model. A model in this sense is not an ideological construct, but an 
analytical category. The ‘prevailing model’ refers to that which emerged during 
the 1970s under the influence of a partial and uneven Sovietisation of the Cuban 
Revolution. (While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the prevailing model 
could be compared and contrasted with what is arguably a new Cuban socialist 
model that has been emerging since 2008 under Raul Castro’s presidency.)  
 
It is hypothesised that Cuba’s pervasive (and now receding) state-centrism is a 
hybrid of statist utopianism and the Stalinist imprint of Sovietisation. That 
Cuba underwent a relative Sovietisation during the 1970s and early 1980s is 
well-established in the literature (see for example Mesa-Lago 1978: 10-29; Diaz 
Vasquez 2011). Also well-established is the state-centric nature of Stalinism (see 
for example Lewin 1974: 97-124) and its “deep affinity” (Lewin 1974: 98) with 
War Communism, in that both were characterised by an “exclusive statism” that 
“still remains at the core of the Soviet conception of socialism” (Lewin 1974: 95). 
                                                             
33 Fernandez Estrada 2011: 8. 
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A small yet important strand of the Cuban studies literature concerns the 
conceptualisation of the Cuban Revolution’s historical continuities and 
discontinuities. Cuba’s late 1960s ‘idealism’ and subsequent Sovietisation are 
usually contrasted; continuities and convergences have received little attention 
and have been inadequately conceptualised. In critiquing the methodology and 
one of the conclusions of Mesa-Lago and Jorge Perez-Lopez’s pro-market/anti-
market ‘pendulum’ periodisation, I draw attention to a striking continuity 
between the 1966–70 and 1971–85 phases: the collectivisation trend, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis. This serves to link the historical analysis in 
Chapter 2 to the characterisation of Cuba’s prevailing socialist model here. 
 
The analysis of the prevailing model draws on the work of two leading Cuban 
Marxist sociologists, Espina Prieto (introduced on page 29) and Juan Valdes 
Paz. Both belong to the socialisation pole of Cuban socialist thought identified in 
the Introduction (see page 8). Espina Prieto associates Cuba’s prevailing model 
with five conceptual identities: the market and capitalism; equality and 
homogeneity; pursuit of social policy objectives, and voluntaristic subordination 
of ‘the economy’ to social policy; nationalisation and socialisation; and the state 
and society. Valdes Paz observes that in some respects, Cuban state socialism is 
a hyper-statised outlier in comparison to other state socialisms.  
 
I show that Espina Prieto’s five conceptual identities of the prevailing model are 
explicable conceptually in terms of statist utopianism; all predate Cuba’s post-
1970 Sovietisation; and all are associated historically with Cuba’s late 1960s 
statist utopianism. Some of these identities—such as equating nationalisation 
with socialisation—are characteristic of both statist utopianism and Stalinism. 
Three other convergences (there may well be others) are also identified.  
 
Pendulum bias and policy zigzags 
 
The Cuban Revolution’s historical continuities and discontinuities have given 
rise to a succession of relatively distinct phases (late 1966 to mid-1970 is 
arguably one such phase). The ‘periodisation’ literature, a minor strand of the 
Cuban studies literature, strives to conceptualise these phases. In his historical 
overview of themes and trends in the Cuban studies literature penned outside of 
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Cuba, Antoni Kapcia (2008: 643) observes that historical analyses of the Cuban 
Revolution have tended to stress either its continuities or discontinuities. One 
analytical pole perceives “an almost whimsical zigzag path from phase to 
phase”; the other pole sees “continuities between otherwise bewildering phases, 
usually explaining these deeper and structural continuities in terms of ideology 
or political culture” (Kapcia 2008: 644).  
 
Kapcia (2008: 637) credits Mesa-Lago’s pioneering periodisation in Cuba in the 
1970s: pragmatism and institutionalization (1978) with influencing subsequent 
scholarship by establishing a template for other periodisations: it “reinforced 
the tendency to see the whole trajectory as essentially chaotic and changeable”. 
Mesa-Lago has since updated his periodisation on numerous occasions, most 
recently in Cuba under Raul Castro: assessing the reforms (2013), co-authored 
with Perez-Lopez. Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez view major and minor phases of 
the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to today as corresponding to the swings of a 
Cuban historical pendulum towards and away from the market.  
 
One such pendulum swing occurred in mid-1970, when Cuba’s late 1960s statist 
utopian ‘great leap forward’ came to an abrupt end after the failure of an all-out 
sugar harvest mobilisation to reach the ambitious target of 10 million tons of 
cane. The PCC’s hopes for rapid industrialisation, and the Cuban Revolution’s 
reputation, had been pinned on exceeding this target. From mid-1970, Fidel 
Castro acknowledged what he described as the PCC leadership’s idealistic and 
utopian approach in the late 1960s. (The conceptualisation of statist utopianism 
in Chapter 1 was grounded in some of the lessons Castro drew from this 
experience). On July 26, 1973, Castro stressed:  
 
We are in the socialist stage of the Revolution, in which, due to the material realities 
and the level of culture and awareness in a society that has just emerged from 
capitalist society, the form of distribution that corresponds [to this stage] is the one 
outlined by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha Program: from each according to their 
capacity, to each according to their work! (cited in Roca 1977: 106).  
 
Accordingly, the PCC line on material incentives essentially reverted to the pre-
1966 position analysed in Chapter 2 and exemplified by the 1965 sugar harvest 
awards. Castro described this approach in the following terms:  
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Together with moral incentives, we must also use material incentives, without abusing 
either one, because the former would lead us to idealism, while the latter would lead 
to individual selfishness. We must act in such a way that economic incentives will not 
become people’s exclusive motivation, nor moral incentives serve to have some live off 
the work of the rest (cited in Roca 1977: 106). 
 
With this attitudinal and corresponding policy shift, it was recognised—as 
Castro had recognised in his 1965 sugar harvest awards speech cited in Chapter 
2—that material incentives could play a positive role in ensuring that those who 
contribute more to society receive more from society in return. It will be recalled 
that it was a shift in the official attitude towards material incentives in late 1966 
that foreshadowed the Revolutionary Offensive launched in 1968, the 
institutional core of which was the suppression of the remnant urban private 
sector comprising small businesses and self-employment. 
 
Importantly however, the early 1970s retreat from statist utopianism embodied 
in the PCC’s renewed emphasis on material incentives (as a complement to 
moral incentives), and in other policy shifts, did not extend to lifting or easing 
the 1968 ban on urban small businesses and self-employment. Thus the core of 
the Revolutionary Offensive’s institutional legacy remained intact. In 1976, the 
ban on urban private enterprise other than self-employment was enshrined in 
Article 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits exploitation in the Marxist sense: 
one person employing another (Fernandez Estrada 2011: 8).  
 
This inconsistency in the PCC’s retreat from the ‘idealism’ of the late 1960s has 
received scant attention in the literature. An example of this analytical deficit is 
Sergio Roca’s widely cited paper ‘Cuban economic policy in the 1970s: the 
trodden paths’. Roca’s (1977: 87) thesis is that Cuba abandoned “the moral 
economy” of the late 1960s. The first of his seven pillars of Cuba’s moral 
economy is the suppression of the urban private sector (Roca 1977: 88). 
Curiously, the fact that this pillar of the Revolutionary Offensive stood tall as 
others were demolished does not rate a mention. His account, which is based on 
the official narrative of the abandonment of ‘idealism’, misses the significance of 
what did not change in the early 1970s.  
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Likewise, when the Revolutionary Offensive expropriated and banned the urban 
private sector, Mesa-Lago analysed this discontinuity. While correctly pointing 
out that it was the continuation of an existing nationalisation trend, his 1969 
paper ‘Ideological radicalization and economic policy in Cuba’ gave due weight 
to the expropriations as the core element of the wider Offensive (as did Roca in 
enumerating his seven pillars of Cuba’s ‘moral economy’). Yet in Cuba in the 
1970s: pragmatism and institutionalization—Mesa-Lago’s 187-page exposition 
of his thesis that the pendulum swung towards market-oriented pragmatism 
under Sovietisation from 1971—the continuity of the prohibition on urban small 
businesses and (until 1978) self-employment is mentioned (Mesa-Lago 1978: 
93) only incidentally and in passing.  
 
This omission is repeated by Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez in their periodisation 
in Cuba under Raul Castro: assessing the reforms (2013). The co-authors 
identify eight pendulum swings “toward or away from the market” since 1959. 
Swings away from the market they term ‘idealist’; swings towards they term 
‘pragmatist’. During each swing cycle, “there were changes—often 
contradictory—with respect to eleven policy areas” (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 
2013: 3). Top of their list of policy areas is ‘collectivisation of the means of 
production’. (They do not define such ‘collectivisation’, but it is synonymous in 
with state acquisition by expropriation or voluntary relinquishment). 
Collectivisation is characteristic of idealist cycles; de-collectivisation is 
characteristic of pragmatist cycles (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2013: 1–3).  
 
Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez (2013: 9) claim that during the 1971–85 pragmatist 
cycle that coincided with Sovietisation, the PCC leadership “essentially reversed 
its earlier idealist policies and initiated a timid journey towards the market”. 
Their next sentence begins with a tacit acknowledgement that this judgement is 
in fact too sweeping: “While there was an expansion of state-controlled 
cooperatives and a gradual absorption of private farms into cooperatives” [my 
emphasis]—i.e. not a policy reversal, nor a shift towards the market—“a number 
of measures contrary to collectivisation were implemented” (Mesa-Lago and 
Perez-Lopez 2013: 9).  
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The measures cited are the relaxation of state bans on agricultural ‘free’ markets 
and on peasants hiring farm labourers; private plots on state farms; citizens 
building and exchanging their own homes; foreign direct investment; and self-
employment (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2013: 10). None of this amounts to 
de-collectivisation (i.e. privatisation). In their haste to fit facts to their schema, 
they forget that homes are not means of production; private plots on state farms 
are still owned by the state; self-employment does not necessarily entail 
privatisation and did not in Cuba at the time; nor does foreign investment, 
allowing farmers to sell some of their produce at market prices or the hiring of 
farm labourers by peasants amount to de-collectivisation.  
 
Contrary to Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez’s claim, the collectivisation trend that 
they place at the top of their list of eleven policy areas was secular rather than 
cyclical from 1959–89, i.e. during four of their eight pendulum swing cycles. 
According to data from Cuba’s National Statistics Office, “the quantitative 
expansion of the state sector occurred throughout three decades, reaching its 
high point in 1989 when it employed some 95% of the Cuban labour force” [my 
emphasis] (Fernandez Estrada 2011: 7).  
 
Between 1966 and 1985, i.e. from the beginning of Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez’s 
late 1960s idealist cycle to the end of their post-1970 pragmatist cycle, the sole 
qualitative change with regard to collectivisation was the 1968 suppression of 
the urban private sector. The collectivisation pendulum did not swing back the 
other way during the 1970s and 1980s. Apart from a very limited opening to 
self-employment in 1978, the 1968 prohibitions remained intact. This is an 
inexplicable—and far from trivial—anomaly for the market pendulum schema. 
The PCC’s swing away from ‘idealism’ from mid-1970, combined with the 
heightened influence of the Soviet Union’s relative pro-market pragmatism, 
should have rolled back the 1968 suppression of the urban private sector and its 
legacy: state ownership and management of almost the entire economy. 
 
That the core of the Revolutionary Offensive’s institutional legacy endured 
intact until 1978, when there was a very limited opening to self employment, 
casts a shadow of doubt over the dominant narrative that the PCC leadership 
abandoned ‘idealism’ during the 1970s. In stressing the striking discontinuities 
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between the 1966–70 and 1971–85 phases of the Cuban Revolution, a 
fundamental continuity between Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ and 
subsequent Sovietisation has not received the attention it merits. 
 
Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez (2013: 24) summarise their analysis as follows: 
“For more than five decades, socialist Cuba’s policies followed a recurring 
pattern of idealist and pragmatist cycles, successively moving away from or 
toward the market”. They attribute these cycles to the clash between idealist 
impulses and the consequences of giving them free reign. During idealistic 
cycles, such as from 1966–70, ambitious goals (e.g. harvesting 10 million tons of 
sugar in 1970; creating a New Human Being) are not achieved. This has adverse 
economic and social consequences that pose a threat to political stability. A new, 
pro-market cycle results in moderately improved economic performance and 
living standards, but at the cost of adverse social consequences such as higher 
unemployment and rising inequality. This gives rise to a new idealist cycle, 
“thus perpetuating a policy seesaw” (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2013: 2). 
 
While the pendulum schema has a beguiling simplicity, it does formalise a 
certain bias. At any historical inflection point, discontinuities overshadow 
continuities. This is what allows us to identify inflection points and demarcate 
phases. Historical continuities are not intrinsically any less important than 
discontinuities, but the latter tend to attract more attention because change 
stands out against a backdrop of continuity. It is the swings of the pendulum 
(i.e. changes of vector, such as towards rather than away from the market) that 
define the phases of a pendulum periodisation; yet continuities from one phase 
to the next may be just as analytically significant. I term this built-in emphasis 
on change over continuity ‘pendulum bias’.  
 
While analyses of the Cuban Revolution that employ the historical pendulum 
analogy explicitly are uncommon,34 an unjustified emphasis on discontinuities 
over continuities is more widespread in the literature (as illustrated by Roca’s 
unbalanced account cited above). Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez’s pendulum 
analysis suffers from two methodological weaknesses. Firstly, pendulum bias 
                                                             
34 Another is what Helen Yaffe terms the Guevarist pendulum. Yaffe perceives a Cuban 
historical pendulum swinging towards and away from Che Guevara’s political-economic 
thought. See Yaffe 2009: 262–70. 
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leads them to exaggerate the depth of the 1971–85 pro-market cycle. Such cycles 
are associated, they claim, with de-collectivisation; yet they fail to recognise the 
secular collectivisation trend from 1968–89. Secondly, they reduce ‘idealism’ 
(i.e. statist utopianism) and Sovietisation (i.e. the assimilation of Stalinism), 
both of which are irreducibly complex phenomena, to the one-dimensionality of 
pro- and anti-market trends. Evidently, this market reductionism is misleading.  
 
In the conceptual framework of this thesis, a reasonable interpretation of the 
secular collectivisation trend would be that the Revolutionary Offensive’s core 
institutional legacy, the near absolute dominance of state ownership and 
management of the economy, was compatible with Sovietisation because statist 
utopianism and Stalinism are both state-centric. The suppression of the urban 
private sector was incorporated into Cuba’s Soviet-inspired Economic Planning 
and Management System (known by its Spanish acronym SDPE). The SDPE, 
which was introduced incrementally between 1976 and 1985, was based on state 
ownership of the means of production (Diaz Vasquez 2011: 125).  
 
The absorption of the core institutional legacy of Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great 
leap forward’ into the creeping Sovietisation of the 1970s and early 1980s is 
consistent with the hybridisation hypothesis. Evidently, statist utopianism and 
Sovietisation each contributed to the state-centrism of the prevailing Cuban 
socialist model, which emerged during this period. The legacy of the ‘great leap 
forward’ contributed to the peculiarity of the prevailing model: as Diaz Vasquez 
(2011: 125) points out, Cuba’s near-absolute dominance of state ownership and 
management of the economy has had no parallel since War Communism. 
 
In statist utopian terms, Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez’s pro- and anti-market 
policy see-saw could be reinterpreted (at least for the period 1966-89) as the 
alternating assertion of binary exclusivity followed by the resort to a reluctant 
pragmatism (see page 34).  When the 1968 ban on self-employment was relaxed 
slightly in 1978, many Cubans found the idea that socialist citizens could work 
for themselves rather than for the state to be morally dubious and difficult to 
accept (Triana Cordovi 2014). In 1986, the PCC’s 3rd Congress launched the 
‘Rectification’ campaign, during which self-employment was once again 
suppressed; it was deemed unnecessary because the state would assume its 
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functions (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2013: 12). In 1992–3, Fidel Castro 
warned that the Cuban Revolution “would continue to expand state ownership 
of the means of production, nationalising even the remaining small farms” 
(Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2013: 15).  
 
There are occasional suggestions or implications in the academic and other 
literature that 1968 (i.e. the Revolutionary Offensive), not 1970-1 (i.e. the onset 
of Sovietisation), was the more significant historical turning point. For example, 
Fernandez Estrada (2011: 6) comments in passing that what he terms Cuba’s 
model of economic functioning35 “has undergone some modifications over the 
past 50 years, although in a general sense it has retained up to now many of the 
fundamental principles adopted since 1968”. He does not say which of these 
principles date(s) back to 1968, but elsewhere in the same source he observes:  
 
The [late 2010] authorisation of the hiring of labour and with it, explicit official 
recognition of the existence of pockets of private capitalist property—at least on the 
scale of the micro-enterprise—is one of the most significant conceptual 
transformations of the past 50 years (Fernandez Estrada 2011: 8).  
 
In a similar vein, veteran Cuban journalist Luis Sexto makes this provocative 
allusion to the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive:  
 
Cuban society now resumes its progress toward socialism, interrupted in 1968 when 
the perception took hold that, in one leap, socialism would be a certainty, even 
hastening that other purely theoretical, even unimaginable society called communism. 
In other words, the perfect society (Sexto 2011). 
 
By ‘unimaginable’, Sexto does not seem to suggest here that communism cannot 
be imagined. It was a communist vision that inspired Cuba’s statist utopian 
‘great leap forward’. Such imaginings, starting with the 16th century Utopian 
socialists, have animated communist strivings for centuries. Indeed, without 
daring to dream a little, the lesser goal of ‘socialism’ that (according to Sexto) 
Cuba now resumes its progress towards might lose its way—just as too much 
dreaming led it astray in the late 1960s. Sexto’s point here is that from 1968, 
                                                             
35 Defined as “the integral expression of the fundamental principles of organisation and 
movement of the national economy within the framework of a definite socio-economic 
system” (Fernandez Estrada 2011: 4). 
70 
 
and for four decades thereafter, the Cuban Revolution’s strivings for 
communism were imbued with a dogmatic certainty and perfectionism. 
 
Peculiarities of Cuban state socialism 
 
As noted in the Introduction, one constituent element of Cuba’s pervasive (and 
now receding) state-centrism—the legacy of the Cuban Revolution’s partial and 
uneven Sovietisation during the 1970s and early 1980s—is widely acknowledged 
and well-documented in the literature. In academic and wider discourse, Cuba’s 
prevailing model is often dubbed ‘state’, ‘actually existing’, ‘real’, ‘traditional’ or 
‘20th century’ socialism, all of which have Soviet bloc connotations. ‘State 
socialism’, while less evocative and more descriptive than these other terms, still 
conveys the impression that Cuban state socialism was cast in the Soviet mould.  
 
Espina Prieto perceives a nodal web (rather than a hierarchy) of six clusters of 
problems of Cuba’s socialist transition. She summarises the first of these nodes 
as the “hyper-statisation of social relations, [excessive] centralisation and 
verticalism,36 paternalism-authoritarianism [and] distributive homogeneity” 
that (see page 29) does not adequately address either the diversity of needs or 
the heterogeneity of inequality (Espina Prieto 2009: 166). These and most of the 
other problems she identifies are not fundamentally a consequence of Cuba’s 
post-Soviet ‘Special Period’—a deep, prolonged crisis of Cuba’s socialist 
transition from which the Cuban Revolution has yet to fully emerge—nor of the 
market-based palliatives adopted since the early 1990s:  
 
They gestated earlier and are associated with the choice of a conception of socialism 
that erroneously identifies the socialisation of property with nationalisation, the 
market with capitalism, equality with homogeneity, the social purpose of the economy 
with its voluntaristic subordination to social ends, and the state with society [my 
emphasis] (Espina Prieto 2009: 168). 
 
                                                             
36 In this context, the Spanish verticalismo refers to the Cuban Revolution’s culture of 
deference, whereby elected representatives and administrators feel, or in fact are, 
unable to make non-trivial decisions (and perhaps even trivial ones) without consulting 
their superiors, and so on up the political-administrative chain of command until it 
reaches, for example, a government minister. Such ‘waiting for orders from above’ 
contributes to Cuba’s hyper-centralised decision-making and to state-centrism. 
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They are problems, then, of the prevailing socialist model, which predates the 
Special Period: it emerged during the 1970s under the influence of Sovietisation. 
Espina Prieto associates the above set of five conceptual identities with the 
prevailing model. When and why did these conceptual identities take hold in 
Cuba? Espina Prieto does not elaborate here, but it is striking that all five may 
be associated conceptually with the phenomenon of statist utopianism. 
 
The subsidiary concept of binary exclusivity was introduced in Chapter 1. Binary 
exclusivity arises from an antipathy to the presence and (in some cases) use of 
capitalist vestiges and a corresponding idealisation of their tangible or symbolic 
communist opposites. It manifests as the tendency, in thought or in practice, to 
emphasise one pole of some duality (e.g. planning-markets) to the exclusion of 
the other. For example, the state is merely a symbolic antithesis of the market, 
because communism is conceived as a stateless society; planning is a tangible 
antithesis, since communism would be based on planning rather than markets.  
 
One conceptual identity of the prevailing model identified by Espina Prieto is 
equating capitalism with the market. Political scientist Rafael Hernandez, editor 
of the Cuban journal Temas, perceives an “old mindset” in Cuba that “sees the 
emergence of capitalism in every expression of the market and in every segment 
of small-scale private property” (cited in Cameron 2011f). An April 9, 2010 letter 
to the editor of the PCC daily, Granma, by one F. Hernandez Gonzalez 
illustrates this viewpoint: “To privatise even the most insignificant branch of our 
economy would lead to the renunciation of socialism” (cited in Cameron 2011h). 
This is a binary exclusive conception of the socialist transitional society in 
relation to the market. What is the origin of this ‘old mindset’ in Cuba?  
 
The genesis of this mentality was not the post-1970 Sovietisation, but the 1968 
Revolutionary Offensive. Fidel Castro’s rationale (see page 48) for suppressing 
the remnant urban private sector conflates ‘the market’—in the guise of small 
private businesses and self-employment—with capitalism (see Chapter 2). This 
perception that capitalism is embodied in mere vestiges of private enterprise in 
a state-dominated, post-capitalist economy and society is symbolism induced by 
an aversion to private enterprise. Post-1968, whenever the state slightly eased 
the ban on small-scale private enterprise, “we [Cuban communists] had a way of 
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coping with the changes that involved stigmatising the emergence of these new 
[economic] actors and new spaces for the market” (Hernandez cited in Cameron 
2011f). The re-emergence of these suppressed capitalist vestiges was stigmatised 
because the socialist transitional society “was defined in absolute terms as state-
centric socialism” [my emphasis] (Hernandez cited in Cameron 2011f). 
 
As acknowledged in Chapter 1, my subsidiary concept of ‘binary exclusivity’ is 
inspired by Espina Prieto’s observation that a ‘maximalist equality paradigm’ 
has given rise to ‘dichotomies’ in Cuba’s social policy. These dichotomies are a 
consequence of conceiving of social reality in terms of ‘antagonistic pairs’ and of 
‘radically excluding’ one term of the duality, rather than striving for their 
possible complementarity. The tendency to emphasise the state to the exclusion 
of the market is one example she cites (Espina Prieto 2006: 366). 
 
Another conceptual element of the prevailing model that Espina Prieto draws 
our attention to is the identification of social equality with homogeneity. The 
homogeneity referred to here is distributive, i.e. the egalitarian distribution of 
consumer goods and equal access to social services. Equality and egalitarianism 
are not in fact identical, but egalitarianism may come to symbolise the state’s 
commitment to equality. This symbolism introduces a conceptual confusion if 
inequality’s symbolic antithesis—distributive egalitarianism—is confused with 
its real antithesis, namely equality. In treating unequal individuals (or unequal 
labour contributions) equally, such egalitarianism is unjust from the standpoint 
of the socialist transition (see page 34 and the footnote to page 51). The 
egalitarian ethos embodied in Espina Prieto’s maximum equality paradigm 
flourished in late 1960s Cuba: withdrawing material incentives and suppressing 
the urban private sector were aimed at creating an egalitarian society. 
  
A third conceptual identity of the prevailing socialist model is equating the 
social purpose of the economy with its voluntaristic subordination to social 
ends. This too is a case of binary exclusivity: here ‘the economy’ is the capitalist 
pole, ‘the social’ the communist pole. It is also a case of opposites being alike. 
Neoclassical economics subordinates social rationality to economic rationality 
(that of capitalist profitability). Statist utopianism merely reverses the terms of 
this subordination. Whereas neoclassical doctrine tends to view ‘the economic’ 
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in isolation from ‘the social’, statist utopianism tends to view ‘the social’ in 
isolation from ‘the economic’. The PCC’s late 1960s drive to moralise Cuba’s 
domestic economic relations illustrates this subordination.  
 
This ‘Marxist’ reductionism (the mirror image of Neoclassical reductionism) 
assumes or hopes that if social objectives are prioritised and economic relations 
are politicised, then the economy will prosper. Since it sees no necessary tension 
between the economic and social goals of the socialist transition, the former 
tend to be subsumed under the latter (e.g. fostering a communist New Human 
Being). In turn, this tends towards the hyper-politicisation of the state’s role in 
the economy. Valdes Paz (2007) sees “a highly centralised and bureaucratised 
state” as characteristic of generic state socialism, together with the dominance 
of “political institutions, actors and political strategies” over economic 
institutions, actors and strategies. Indeed: 
 
Cuban state socialism would seem to be an outlier in this respect: planning, and a 
[central] plan, that are highly politicised; [an] economic system with less of a presence 
and weight of market relations and, given this, more bureaucratic mediations; the 
absolute priority of public goods and thus of social policy; a highly statised economy; 
[and] a politically legitimised underconsumption (Valdes Paz 2007). 
 
Note that Valdes Paz regards Cuba’s ‘highly statised economy’ as state-centric in 
comparison to other state socialisms that emerged during the 20th century. We 
shall return to these observations of Valdes Paz shortly.  
 
According to Espina Prieto, a fourth conceptual identity of Cuba’s prevailing 
socialist model is the identification of the state with society. This conceptual 
identity, like the other three we have examined so far, is explicable in terms of 
statist utopianism. The corollary of communist antipathy to market relations 
and remnant private enterprise is a corresponding idealisation of their symbolic 
communist antithesis: the proletarian state. Accordingly, that state and statised 
social relations may come to symbolise distance from capitalism and proximity 
to communism. Such symbolism is illusory if a means to an end (the proletarian 
state as a bridge to communism) has become an end in itself (the state’s 
absorption of society as it imposes a communist vision on society).  
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Statist utopianism blurs the perceptual distinction between state and society by 
hyper-statising social relations. The more the state ‘absorbs’ society the more 
society and state appear to merge—a contrived rather than organic merging. 
Ideology aside, the perception of state/society identity is a conscious reflection 
of the social reality of the state’s growing omnipresence. By statising the urban 
remnants of private enterprise, the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive consolidated 
the material basis for state/society perceptual identity. Despite this, no few 
Cuban Marxists are keenly aware of the distinction between state and society.  
Outspoken Cuban intellectual and PCC member Alfredo Guevara told a 
gathering of students in 2011: “The [Cuban] state is all-pervasive, especially 
the bureaucratic state apparatus” (Guevara, A cited in Cameron 2011b).  
 
Recall the striking juxtaposition of Granma headings from the April 7, 1968 
edition: ‘Nation’s private sector now almost completely nationalised’, and ‘We 
are socialists’ (cited in Mesa-Lago 1969: 203). The first heading can be read in 
two ways: 1) the private sector has been ‘almost completely’ suppressed; and 2) 
statisation of the means of production is ‘almost complete’. One cannot applaud 
the first without applauding the second. Idealisation of the state’s ‘absorption’ of 
society is the flip side of an antipathy towards private enterprise.  
 
Let us retrace our steps. Espina Prieto perceives five conceptual identities 
associated with Cuba’s prevailing socialist model. We have analysed four so far: 
the market and capitalism identity; the equality and egalitarianism identity; 
equating the pursuit of social policy objectives with voluntaristic subordination 
of economic policy to social policy; and the state and society identity. We have 
shown that all are associated conceptually with statist utopianism; all predate 
Cuba’s post-1970 Sovietisation; and all four are associated historically with 
Cuba’s late 1960s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’. Two conceptual threads 
run through the preceding analysis: binary exclusivity and state-centrism.  
 
These four conceptual identities, and the institutional peculiarities of Cuban 
state socialism identified by Valdez Paz in the indented citation above, are 
mutually reinforcing and thus tightly bound in the manner of a Gordian knot. 
Let us now briefly explore this state-centric conceptual and institutional nexus.  
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The market/capitalism identity sees the emergence of capitalism in any opening 
to private enterprise and markets, however trivial it may be in comparison to 
the overwhelming dominance of the Cuban state with regard to ownership and 
management of the economy. Likewise, the equality/homogeneity identity 
regards distributive egalitarianism as symbolic of the Cuban state’s commitment 
to equality. Ensuring that, for example, every Cuban citizen receives their 
monthly quota of rationed, state-subsidised beans demands a dedicated state 
supply chain, a dense network of state-run rationed goods stores and a sizeable 
state administrative apparatus...and inspectors to inspect the inspectors.  
 
Subordination of ‘the economy’ to social policy objectives is also state-centric. It 
demands, as Valdes Paz (2007) points out, “planning, and a [central] plan, that 
are highly politicised” and “an economic system with less of a presence and 
weight of market relations and, given this, more bureaucratic mediations”. In 
state socialism comparative terms, Cuba is a hyper-statised outlier in this 
regard, as well as in “the absolute priority ... of social policy; a highly statised 
economy; [and] a politically legitimised underconsumption” (Valdes Paz 2007).  
 
Politically legitimised underconsumption allows the Cuban state to concentrate 
society’s economic surplus in its hands for the purpose of (among other things) 
distributive homogeneity. In turn, distributive homogeneity requires a highly 
centralised and politicised administrative planning apparatus. This goes some 
way to explaining what Espina Prieto perceives as Cuba’s “[excessive] 
centralisation” and “paternalism-authoritarianism” (Espina Prieto 2009: 166). 
The citizen’s dependence on the state’s distributive egalitarianism (and on the 
state more generally) fosters a paternalistic relationship between the citizen and 
the state, a relationship that is by nature authoritarian. Finally, the state/society 
identity is self-evidently state-centric. It is a meta-identity that encompasses the 
other three of Espina Prieto’s conceptual identities that we have analysed so far.  
 
Statist utopianism and Stalinism 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Cuban state’s incursions into private ownership of 
the means of production may have acquired a statist utopian tinge as early as 
1964. These and further incursions acquired an enduring ideological symbolism: 
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“it was thought—and it is still thought—that socialism is statisation. We really 
fell into this confusion in 1964–5 in continuing with the process of 
nationalisations” [my emphasis] (Everleny Perez cited in Hernandez et al 2008: 
102). Behind the mid to late 1960s expropriation momentum there was, then, a 
state-centric conception (‘socialism is statisation’) of the socialist transitional 
society. In the next and last wave of Cuban expropriations, the Revolutionary 
Offensive, this conception was imbued with a binary exclusive moralism.  
 
The ‘socialism is statisation’ identity dissolves the vital conceptual distinction 
between nationalisation and socialisation.37 This brings us to the fifth and last of 
Espina Prieto’s conceptual identities of Cuba’s prevailing socialist model: the 
identification of nationalisation with socialisation. This is perhaps the most 
striking and fundamental conceptual convergence between statist utopianism 
and Stalinism. It both reflects and reinforces their respective state-centrisms.      
 
Trotsky (1991 [1937]) pointed out that state property was the foundation of the 
ruling Soviet bureaucracy’s despotic power and institutionalised privileges. He 
regarded the state’s “dissolution” into society to be “the best index” of progress 
towards communism (Trotsky 1991 [1937]: 92). In his critique of Stalinism, 
Trotsky also drew attention to the conceptual distinction between state and 
social property and to their Stalinist conflation. Echoing Engels’ conception of 
the withering away of the proletarian state in the socialist transition, he argued 
that:  
 
State property becomes the property of ‘the whole people’ only to the degree that 
social privilege and differentiation disappear, and therewith the necessity of the state. 
In other words: state property is converted into [social] property in proportion as it 
ceases to be state property (Trotsky 1991 [1937]: 201).  
 
Trotsky’s theoretical point had a political purpose, being directed against the 
Stalinist glorification of the Soviet state and state property. Given that Stalinist 
regimes are based on the ruling bureaucracy’s administration of state property, 
it is hardly surprising that Soviet and Eastern European Stalinist regimes 
relegated the beginning of the withering away of the state to some remote future 
                                                             
37 Socialisation is discussed briefly in the Introduction (see page 8) in relation to 
paradigmatic poles of contemporary socialist thought in Cuba.  
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that had nothing to do with the present or the foreseeable future.38 Stalinist 
doctrine may not have contradicted Engels in this regard, but the states that 
elaborated this doctrine showed no signs of even beginning to wither away.  
 
The socialisation of Cuban state property imposes itself on the 21st century 
agenda of Cuban Marxists “because actually existing socialism has been a state-
centric model that identified the elimination of capitalist private property with 
the statisation of property, and social property with state property”; and 
furthermore: “In regarding the statisation of some property as equivalent to its 
possession by the whole of society, the state is identified with the whole of 
society” [emphasis in original] (Acanda Gonzalez et al 2007: 137). Cuban 
socialisation advocates urge the solution of this decades-old Cuban problem, 
which is posed rather sharply by Cuban philosopher Jose Ramon Fabelo Corzo:   
 
If I’m not able to decide what is produced, nor to what end, nor participate in 
management, in planning, and much of the time what I earn is not related to what I 
do, what sense of ownership am I going to have, am I going to extract this out of pure 
ideology? Sometimes yes, but not in the majority of cases (Fabelo Corzo cited in 
Cameron 2011g). 
 
To Valdes Paz, democratisation (i.e. the socialisation of powers) cannot be 
confined to Cuba’s economic sphere. He asks rhetorically in relation to 
contemporary Cuba: “Is a participatory economy conceivable in a highly 
centralised, authoritarian, bureaucratised political system with a low level of 
political participation?” (Valdez Paz 2007). Citing Spanish philosopher 
Francisco Fernandez Buey, he suggests it is easier to define socialism by what it 
is not. However, “the Marxist conception of socialism as a transition towards 
self-government and self-management” seems valid: citizens participate fully 
when they participate in decision-making, he argues (Valdes Paz 2007).  
 
The Cuban Revolution and participation are synonymous. However, as Rafael 
Hernandez aptly observes:  
                                                             
38 An intriguing parallel can be drawn here between Stalinism and social democracy. 
Social democracy idealised the capitalist state and its parliamentary democracy, 
creating an artificial divide between its ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ programmes—
theoretical cover for its pursuit of the (highly dubious) reformist road to socialism.  
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[I]t is in terms of consultation and mobilisation that this model that is changing has 
been most participatory; it has been much less so in relation to facilitating 
involvement in decision-making and in control over the implementation of political 
decisions from below [i.e. at the grassroots] (Hernandez 2013: 2).  
 
This participatory deficit predates the post-1970 Sovietisation. Mesa-Lago notes 
that in 1968–70, several foreign Marxist scholars visited Cuba, most of them at 
Fidel Castro’s invitation. Though supportive of the Revolution, all urged “a more 
democratic, participatory type of socialism” (Mesa-Lago 1978: 63). One of them, 
the US sociologist Maurice Zeitlin, reported that unlike in the Soviet Union, the 
wage gap between Cuban production workers and clerical, administrative and 
technical personnel was minimal; and that as far as he could ascertain, Cuba’s 
top leaders lived simply (Zeitlin 1970: 11). While talk of the New Human Being 
was tinged with “Spanish overstatement, self-flattery and romanticism”, the 
commitment to this vision was real (Zeitlin 1970: 77).  
 
With its egalitarian ethos, contempt for bureaucratic privilege and enthusiasm 
for nurturing a communist New Human Being, the Cuban Revolution in the late 
1960s was in most respects a stark contrast to Stalinism. However, that contrast 
was minimal with regard to public debate and participation in decision-making: 
 
Despite their experimentalism and originality in many areas, the Cuban 
revolutionaries have so far done little to establish institutions to guarantee that 
competing points of view can be heard within the revolutionary socialist consensus; 
that meaningful alternatives are debated; [and] that policies are initiated, as well as 
implemented by the citizenry at large (Zeitlin 1970: 74).   
 
The Cuban Revolution’s mass circulation press has not been renowned for 
spirited debate or investigative zeal, though this is beginning to change. This 
reputation also predates Sovietisation. In 1969, Kahl (1969: 36) observed that 
there were “no channels for publishing openly critical arguments. The 
newspapers and magazines are monotonous reiterations of the official view”. By 
contrast, in the mid-1960s there had been an open controversy on material and 
moral incentives and economic management in Cuba. In early 1967, all of the 
specialist publications that had housed this lively yet respectful debate were 
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closed down on the basis that “due to the lack of ideological maturity, it was not 
possible to discuss publicly the problems of the nation” (Mesa-Lago 1972: 69).  
 
A possible clue to this curious convergence with Stalinism at the height of the 
PCC leadership’s explicit rejection of Soviet orthodoxy lies in Kahl’s reflections 
on Cuban youth. He was delighted to find that most “display a joy, a 
comradeship, a combination of a deep belief and an honest and playful sense of 
humor about it that is truly refreshing” (Kahl 1969: 37). Yet he also noted a 
dogmatic streak in the political psychology of the youth cadres he met: “Cuban 
youthful militants have the security of conviction and the narrowness that goes 
with it. They are building utopia, and it completely absorbs their energies” (Kahl 
1969: 37). Dogmatism might be the inevitable result, he suggested, of a “militant 
belief in the vision of utopia. True believers of any creed lose objectivity and 
curiosity. They know the answers in advance” (Kahl 1969: 37).  
 
Evidently, Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ demanded militant 
conviction more than doubt, debate or critical thought. The die had been cast, 
and debate would get in the way of doing what had to be done. Despite this 
utopian dogmatism and in contrast to it, Cuba’s communists seemed “proud of 
the fact that their Marxism-Leninism is pragmatic; they will try anything that 
might work” (Kahl 1969: 36). Fidel Castro (cited in Mesa-Lago 1972: 68) 
complained in late 1966 that he was accused of being “a heretic of Marxism-
Leninism” because he disagreed with Soviet dogma. The ethos of the Cuban 
Revolution in the late 1960s was, then, a curious amalgam of exuberant 
experimentalism and irreverence for received wisdom, blended with an equally 
youthful utopian dogmatism associated with Castro’s charismatic leadership.     
 
The dogmatic element may arise from binary exclusivity, which lends itself to a 
certain speculative circularity. For example, an implicit assumption of Fidel 
Castro’s rationale for the suppression Cuba’s remnant urban private sector was 
that state ownership and management are inherently superior: it was assumed 
that the state takeover would resolve the perceived problems of this sector. The 
supposed superiority of state ownership and management at the scale of small 
and tiny entities did not need to be demonstrated in practice; through the 
dogmatic lens of a communist moral stricture, it was deducible from Marx’s 
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vision of a classless society. This deductive rationalism is strikingly convergent 
(in substance if not in style) on Stalinist ‘Marxist-Leninist’ dogmatism. It may 
be contrasted to the ‘principled pragmatism’ of an organic approach.  
 
To recapitulate, it may be case that as early as 1964, well before the onset of 
Cuba’s post-1970 Sovietisation, the ‘socialism is statisation’ conception took 
hold. This conception, entrenched in the Revolutionary Offensive, dissolves the 
conceptual distinction between nationalisation and socialisation. In this respect, 
Cuba’s late 1960s statist utopianism was compatible with and convergent on 
Stalinism—consistent with the hybridisation hypothesis. What I term Cuba’s 
socialisation pole of socialist thought perceives a participatory deficit with 
respect to decision-making. It urges a socialisation, i.e. a decentralisation and 
democratisation, of state power and property. The participatory deficit, Cuba’s 
notoriously dull press officialism (now gradually receding) and a certain utopian 
dogmatism all took hold prior to Sovietisation, yet are convergent on Stalinism 
and thus likely points of hybridisation between the latter and statist utopianism. 
This too is consistent with the hybridisation hypothesis. 
 
The ‘socialism is statisation’ conception of the socialist transition idealises the 
post-capitalist state. However, Stalinism and statist utopianism do so for quite 
different reasons, and their respective ideal type states are qualitatively distinct. 
In light of Trotsky’s seminal critique of Stalinism, the Stalinist regime idealises 
its state because bureaucratic hyper-statisation is the institutional pillar of its 
privileges and social domination. The Stalinist state is essentially inegalitarian, 
insofar as it upholds bureaucratic privileges. Popular participation in such states 
is formalised, ritualised and regimented, and the Stalinist social order is 
propped up by a vast and pervasive coercive apparatus. Figuratively speaking, 
the Stalinist state is the omnipresent police officer and party-state bureaucrat.  
 
By contrast, if Cuba’s late 1960s ‘great leap forward’ is a typical expression of a 
revolutionary society giving free reign to its statist utopianism impulses, then 
the ideal type of the statist utopian state is egalitarian and anti-bureaucratic. It 
is based on political consciousness, mass mobilisation and mass participation in 
carrying out the initiatives of a charismatic leadership. Statist utopianism 
idealises this state because it is the means by which a compelling communist 
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vision is imposed on society; and the state acquires a corresponding symbolism. 
This state is the omnipresent moral guardian of an austere egalitarianism. 
 
I leave it to the reader to ponder to what degree, and in what proportion, Cuba’s 
prevailing socialist model embodies a hybrid of these two ideal state types. My 
own judgement is that hybridisation was considerable; and that the statist 
utopian type has always predominated in the state-centrism of this model. The 
evidence and arguments in favour of this judgement are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, in which Cuba’s post-1970 Sovietisation has necessarily remained in the 
analytical background so that statist utopianism’s contribution to state-centrism 
could come to the fore. This could be a fruitful avenue for further research. 
  
Conclusions 
 
Continuities and convergences between Cuba’s late 1960s ‘idealist’ phase and its 
subsequent partial and uneven Sovietisation have been understated, overlooked 
or inadequately conceptualised in the periodisation literature and in other 
historical accounts. Dominant narratives regarding the PCC’s abandonment of 
‘idealism’ in favour of Soviet pro-market pragmatism during the 1970s and early 
1980s fail to account for the persistence of the 1968 bans on small businesses 
and (for the most part) self-employment. Two methodological weaknesses in 
Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez’s pro- and anti-market ‘historical pendulum’ 
analysis were identified: market reductionism and what I term pendulum bias. 
 
Five conceptual identities of the prevailing model are explicable conceptually in 
terms of statist utopianism; all predate the onset of Sovietisation; and all are 
associated historically with Cuba’s late 1960s statist utopianism. State-centrism 
is the nexus between these conceptual identities and certain institutional 
peculiarities of the prevailing model. This suggests that statist utopianism’s 
contribution to state-centrism has been significant, pervasive and enduring.  
 
Two lines of evidence examined in this chapter converge in support of the 
hybridisation hypothesis. Firstly, the secular collectivisation trend from 1966-89 
and the absorption into Cuba’s Soviet-inspired SDPE of the core institutional 
legacy of Cuba’s late 1960s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ are best explained 
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as a merging of that legacy with Sovietisation. In some respects, the state- 
centrism of statist utopianism and that of Stalinism are quite compatible and 
complementary, despite the contrasts between these distinctive phenomena. 
Secondly, certain conceptual identities and institutional peculiarities of the 
prevailing model comprise a tightly bound state-centric nexus that cannot be 
explained on the basis of Sovietisation alone—and which therefore seems to be a 
peculiar hybrid of statist utopianism and the Stalinist imprint of Sovietisation. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has argued that the nature of ‘idealism’ or ‘utopianism’ in Cuba’s 
post-1959 socialist transition, and the peculiarity of Cuban state socialism, have 
been inadequately conceptualised. This was found to be a special case of a larger 
conceptual deficit in the Spanish- and English-language literature: there is no 
well-developed concept of utopianism-as-idealism in the specific context of the 
socialist transition. The thesis developed the concept of statist utopianism as a 
distinctive approach to the socialist transition: imposing a communist vision on 
society rather than striving for its realisation. The essence of that imposition 
was explained in theoretical terms by drawing on Marx and Engels’ historical 
materialism and on Engels’ conception of the withering away of the proletarian 
state. It was argued that two contrasting attitudes to capitalist vestiges 
correspond to antithetical approaches to the socialist transition: organic 
transcendence and statist utopianism.  
 
Organic transcendence is associated with openness to the possibility that 
capitalist vestiges and their tangible or symbolic communist antitheses may be 
complementary vis-à-vis communist goals. Statist utopianism is associated with 
binary exclusivity, namely antipathy towards certain capitalist vestiges and a 
corresponding idealisation of their tangible or symbolic communist antitheses. 
Accordingly, one pole of a duality (such as planning-markets) tends to be 
emphasised to the exclusion of the other. Such one-sidedness introduces or 
intensifies an incongruence between causally related capitalist vestiges or more 
generally, an incongruence of the socialist model. This may manifest as statist 
utopian paradoxes, such as that excessively detailed planning undermines the 
effectiveness of planning itself. As a result, statist utopian progress is contrived 
and fragile, and is likely to be pyrrhic and ephemeral. This contrasts with the 
authenticity and solidity of organic progress towards communism. 
 
The thesis developed the argument that statist utopianism has a state-centric 
dynamic: the state tends to ‘absorb’ rather than ‘dissolve into’ society. To the 
degree that the state is obliged to substitute for the socially indispensable 
functions of suppressed capitalist vestiges, the size and coercive reach of the 
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state apparatus expand and the state is entrenched in society. Consequently, 
statist utopianism is conducive to bureaucratisation.  
 
As well as its political-economic dimensions, statist utopianism has intrinsic 
subjective dimensions, among them a distinctive utopian political psychology 
that may be expressed in statist utopian illusions and associated voluntarism, 
dogmatism and moralism. Statist utopianism arises from the interplay of 
strivings for communism and ‘objective’ possibilities and constraints on the 
socialist transition. As doctrine and praxis, statist utopianism is immature 
radicalism (rather than mature radicalism). 
 
The core and subsidiary concepts developed in this thesis were used to re-
interpret, in a way that has not previously been attempted, the socialist 
transition in Cuba. The PCC’s 1968–70 Revolutionary Offensive was a statist 
utopian ‘great leap forward’, i.e. a political-ideological crusade to suppress 
capitalist vestiges. A shift in the official attitude towards and policies regarding 
material incentives in late 1966 foreshadowed the 1968 suppression of the 
remnant urban private sector comprising small businesses and self-
employment. My subsidiary concept of binary exclusivity helped to explain this 
shift in terms of statist utopianism. Inconsistencies in the official rationale for 
the Revolutionary Offensive’s suppression of private enterprise drew attention 
to the distorting effects of viewing society through a lens of binary exclusivity 
and moral stricture. From a moral compass orienting to the communist horizon, 
morality became a stricture to be imposed on society. The systematic 
withdrawal of material incentives from late 1966 and the suppression of 
remnant urban private enterprise were an attempt to mould Cuba’s domestic 
economic relations in conformity to prevailing notions of communist morality. 
 
Cuba’s statist utopian ‘great leap forward’ targeted three relatively superficial 
capitalist vestiges: material incentives, remnant private enterprise and their 
associated individualism. The latter was not uprooted by statist utopian 
suppression, and merely expressed itself in other forms. Formally, the tens of 
thousands of small and tiny enterprises nationalised in the Revolutionary 
Offensive were public property and served the public. In reality, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many—perhaps most—have operated as quasi-private 
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businesses that steal from the state to resell on the black market. Statist utopian 
suppression introduced an incongruence between state ownership and 
management, on the one hand, and the atomised nature of these economic 
niches and the negligible degree of socialisation of their labour processes. 
Statisation of the economic niches vacated by the suppressed private sector and 
the state’s efforts to suppress the re-emergence of petty private enterprise gave 
rise to the perception, and the reality, of the state’s approach to omnipresence. 
 
The thesis hypothesised that the pervasive (and now receding) state-centrism of 
Cuba’s prevailing socialist model is a hybrid of statist utopianism and the 
Stalinist legacy of a partial and uneven Sovietisation process during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. State-centric continuities between Cuba’s late 1960s statist 
utopianism and subsequent Sovietisation have been understated, overlooked or 
insufficiently conceptualised. Dominant narratives regarding the PCC’s 
abandonment of ‘idealism’ in favour of Soviet pro-market pragmatism during 
the 1970s and early 1980s fail to account for the persistence of the 1968 bans on 
small businesses and (for the most part) self-employment. Two methodological 
weaknesses in a representative ‘historical pendulum’ analysis of Cuban 
economic policy were identified: market reductionism and pendulum bias. 
 
Drawing on the scholarship of two leading Cuban sociologists, the thesis argued 
that a cluster of conceptual identities of Cuba’s prevailing socialist model are 
explicable conceptually in terms of statist utopianism; that all predate the onset 
of Sovietisation; and that all are associated historically with Cuba’s late 1960s 
statist utopian ‘great leap forward’. These identities underpin the model insofar 
as the model has been shaped by conceptions of the socialist transitional society 
and by corresponding approaches to the socialist transition. It was argued that 
state-centrism is the nexus between these conceptual elements of the model and 
certain institutional peculiarities of Cuban state socialism. This suggests that 
that statist utopianism’s contribution to the state-centrism of the prevailing 
model has been significant, pervasive and enduring.  
 
Two lines of evidence examined in the thesis were found to converge in support 
of the hybridisation hypothesis. The secular collectivisation trend from 1966-89 
and Sovietisation’s absorption of the core institutional legacy of late 1960s 
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statist utopianism are best explained in terms of a merging of statist utopianism 
and the Stalinist imprint. It was concluded that in some respects, the state-
centrism of statist utopianism and that of Stalinism are compatible and 
complementary, despite the contrasts between these two distinctive phenomena 
of post-capitalist societies. Furthermore, it was concluded that certain 
conceptual identities and institutional peculiarities of the prevailing socialist 
model comprise a mutually reinforcing state-centric nexus that cannot be 
explained on the basis of Sovietisation alone, and which therefore seems to be a 
peculiar hybrid of statist utopianism and the Stalinist imprint of Sovietisation. 
 
The concept of statist utopianism developed in this thesis makes a theoretical 
contribution to the Marxist understanding of the dynamics of socialist 
transition. It casts the Cuban socialist transition, and the PCC’s post-2008 
renovation project, in a distinct light. Applying this novel conceptual framework 
to an analysis of the emerging Cuban model was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The thesis makes a modest contribution to the contemporary Cuban and wider 
debate on the past, present and future of Cuba’s socialist project. 
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